

**MACV**  
*Sample*

Ref: 89-FOI-0102

Mr. John B. Dwyer  
430 Westbrook  
Dayton, OH 45415

Dear Mr. Dwyer:

This is in response to your January 13, 1989, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request regarding Military Assistance Command Vietnam Special Operations Group (MACVSOG) documents which was received in this directorate on January 17, 1989.

Per your reformulated request as discussed with Commander Langerman of my staff on August 25, 1989, the enclosed documents have been determined to be responsive and fulfill your request:

- a. Annex A (Special Operations), 1964 MACV Command history, 14 January 1964.
- b. Annex B (Studies and Observations Group), 1971-1972 MACV Command History, c. April 1972.
- c. Annex M (Special Operations), 1966 MACV Command History, 5 May 1967.
- d. Annex N (Special Operations), 1965 MACV Command History, 2 June 1966.

These four enclosed documents have been reviewed by the United States Department of State and the Joint Staff. The information that has been redacted or deleted is pursuant to Title 5 USC 552:

--(b)(1) - material which is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356 in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Such information concerns military plans, weapons, or operations; foreign government information; intelligence activities or sources; and foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States.

--(b)(6) - information release of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

You are advised that you have the right to appeal the decision to deny material that has been exempted from release by Major General Richard B. Goetze Jr., USAF, an Initial Denial Authority for the Joint Staff. Any such appeal should offer

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justification to support reversal of the initial denial and should be forwarded within 60 calendar days after your receipt of this letter to the following address:

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)  
Directorate for Freedom of Information and  
Security Review  
Pentagon, Room 2C757  
Washington, DC 20301-1400

In accordance with the Department of Defense Freedom of Information Act Regulation published at 32 CFR 286, Federal Register Volume 54, No. 155, of August 14, 1989, we have categorized your request as commercial in nature. Commercial requesters are required to pay search, review, and reproduction costs associated with their requests. Thus, you will encounter an assessable fee for any work related to your request. However, should the total cost be less than \$15.00, fees would be waived.

Established Department of Defense fees are: clerical search or review - \$12.00 per hour; professional search or review - \$25.00 per hour; executive review - \$45.00; computer search - varies according to the system used; microfiche - \$0.25 per page; reproduction - \$0.15 per page; and publications or reports - \$0.02 per page.

The costs attributable to you in this instance are reproduction costs as these documents have been previously released and are in the public domain. The chargeable costs of processing your commercial request consisted of 475 pages of office machine reproduction at \$.15 per page.

Please indicate the FOIA reference number above on a check or money order made payable to the U.S. Treasurer in the amount of \$71.25. Send the payment within 30 days to this office at the address previously indicated in this letter.

Sincerely,

W. M. McDonald  
Director  
Freedom of Information  
and Security Review

Enclosures:  
As stated

CYT/Langerman:mml:89-0102 MACV:891002: grn\_\_\_ pnk\_\_\_ wht\_\_\_

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
APO San Francisco, California 96213

04  
2-0

MACSOG

14 January 1966

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Annex A, 1964 MACV Command History

TO: Sec Distribution

1. (U) Attached as an inclosure in Annex A, Special Operations, to the 1964 Command History.

2. (U) Because of the sensitivity of the information contained in this annex, its distribution has been restricted to those agencies considered to have an essential need-to-know. It is requested that no further distribution be made without the express consent of this command's headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
Annex A - Special Operations  
w/Appendix

*Howard D. Schuler*  
HOWARD D. SCHULER  
Captain, AGC  
Asst AG

Distribution:

2 - JCS  
2 - GHO  
2 - OSD  
2 - CMC  
2 - CSA  
2 - CSAF  
5 - CINCPAC  
1 - COMUSMACV (J5)  
1 - MACSOG (5)

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REMOVED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

DAMH 76-38

SOG CONTROL # 000687-66  
COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES  
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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JCS FILE COPY

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1.1.1.1.1.1

THIS DOCUMENT IS A SUMMARY OF THE ACTIVITIES  
FOR 1964 AND IS DEVELOPED FROM RECORDS AVAILABLE  
AND FROM THE PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
ASSIGNED AS OF 30 JUNE 1965

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ANNEX A (Special Operations) to  
MACV Command History 1964

(This annex summarizes the activities of the Studies and Observations Group (SOG), Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), during 1964. Details of these activities are contained in the attached appendix).

1. Background:

a. SOG was organized on 24 January 1964 as the Special Operations Group under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff, MACV. As such, its activities

Its mission was to execute an intensified program of harassment, diversion, political pressure, capture of prisoners, physical destruction, acquisition of intelligence, generation of propaganda, and diversion of resources, against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

b. Policy guidance for the conduct of special operations, as received from Washington in March, was based on the philosophy that such operations were desirable, on a non-competitive basis with respect to resources allocated to counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam (SVN). Thus, a limited program would be implemented with a relatively modest increase in tempo to produce measurable effects on the DRV. The overall plan was designated MACV UPLAN 34A.

2. Operations:

a. Air and Airborne:

(1) Airborne operations against the DRV consisted of small scale demolition operations, collection of intelligence, interdiction of lines of communication, and limited psychological warfare operations.

Problems encountered included:

(a) Poor security during training and, after insertion, poor weather for operations.

(b) Rugged terrain for survivability.

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(c) Need for closer coordination between [redacted] 703, [redacted] AVMAF, and Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF).

(d) Use of aircraft (C-123) with inadequate capabilities for the operational tasks.

b. Maritime:

(1) Maritime operations against the DRV consisted of raids on facilities, Swatow's and [redacted]; bombardment of shore installations; and long range probes. Eight Patrol Torpedo Boats (PTF) were provided during the year with approximately 145 Vietnamese personnel as crews. [redacted]

(2) Problems encountered during the operations:

- (a) Restrictions due to Seventh Fleet operations in the Gulf of Tonkin.
- (b) Armament.
- (c) Poor weather (typhoons).
- (d) Concern over DRV [redacted] reaction, which limited the area of operations.
- (e) Maintenance, spare parts, and equipment difficulties.

c. Psychological:

(1) Psychological operations were [redacted] in North Vietnam (DRV). These operations elicited positive DRV reaction and advantage was taken of it in subsequent psychological operations. Continued studies were made and disseminated on DRV target groups and governmental apparatus.

d. Intelligence:

Intelligence was also collected on order of battle and the location of military installations in both the DRV and Laos. Target analysis was furnished to 2d Air Division, USAF, in support of the various air strike programs conducted in those two countries.

e. Logistics:

Funding and logistics support was complicated [redacted]

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was required during the year to establish standard procedures which would facilitate the inherently complex nature of such support

Appendix:

SOG Historical Summary 1964

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ADMINISTRATION

ORGANIZATION:

1. The Studies and Observations Group (SOG) was formally organized on 24 January 1964 by General Order 6, Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, dated 24 January 1964. At the time of its inception it was designated as the Special Operations Group, consisted of six officers and two enlisted men and was under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff, MACV. Further it was designated as a separate staff section under COMUSMACV with J-5 having special cognizance of actions accomplished. Its Commander was Colonel [REDACTED]. The mission of the organization was directed by JCS to be an intensified program of action against North Vietnam [REDACTED]

MANNING:

2. Initial manning was austere and operations depended largely on TDY augmentation. CENCPAC established TDY Navy support for U.S. Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD)<sup>2</sup> as follows:

A. Repair and Maintenance Team:

- (1) First increment - Two Officers, 11 Enlisted.
- (2) Second increment (for support of four boats) - Seven additional enlisted.

2 (S) CENCPAC msg 292126Z JAN 1964

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(3) Third increment (for support of six boats) - Five additional enlisted.

(4) Fourth increment (for support of eight boats) - Six additional enlisted.

B. Boat Training Team: Strength to vary depending on the number of boats and the rate at which Vietnamese crews complete training, based on an allowance of two officers and ten enlisted men per PTF.

C. Seal Training Team: Composed of two officers and ten enlisted.

D. Marine Recon Team: Composed of one officer and three enlisted.

3. CPO provided that [REDACTED] would handle the administration of personnel records for Mobile Support Team (MST) and boat training teams.<sup>3</sup>

[REDACTED]

5. Insofar as permanent party personnel were concerned, COMUSMACV forwarded to CINCPAC, in February 1964, a Joint Table of Distribution (JTD)

3 (S) CNO msg 1521236Z JAN 1964

4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]

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proposing an organization of [REDACTED] personnel (133 military [REDACTED])  
for approval. CIECPAC forwarded the JTD to JCS on 17 March 1964 recommend-  
ing the reduction of total spaces to [REDACTED] (68 military and 23 civilians).<sup>6</sup>  
COMUSMACV recommended further consideration of the original recommended  
JTD.<sup>7</sup> CIECPAC advised that an interim 100 man JTD was approved by JCS.<sup>8</sup>  
CIECPAC furnished JCS with a final proposed JTD composed of [REDACTED] personnel  
(97 military [REDACTED])<sup>9</sup> This JTD, plus two additional Air Force  
officer spaces/<sup>was</sup> approved by JCS.<sup>10</sup>

6. At the time the JTD was forwarded to JCS by CIECPAC serial 00385,  
the same letter authorized a TDY Army augmentation of one officer and 15  
enlisted to assist in the training of Vietnamese [REDACTED] at Camp Long Thanh.<sup>11</sup>  
The need for this team had previously been recognized and MACV had requested  
Commanding General, USARV to provide this training detachment not later  
than 25 March 1964, and to provide emphasis on the following subjects for  
predeployment training:<sup>12</sup>

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. Survival techniques pertinent to Southeast Asia (SEA).
- c. River and obstacle crossing techniques.
- d. Advanced first aid.
- e. Methods of instructing all the above subjects, plus tactics,  
weapons, and airborne training, to include field exercises.

6 (S) CIECPAC ltr 5320/40 ser: 00385

10 (S) JCS msg 110700Z FEB 1964

7 (S) COMUSMACV msg 280505Z MAR 1964

11 (S) CIECPAC ltr Ser: 00385

8 (S) CIECPAC msg 010212Z APR 1964

12 (S) MACV msg 110700Z Feb 64

9 (S) CIECPAC ltr 00589 of 24 APR 1964

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7. Because of increasing concern with the security of the USMACV base in general, COMUSMACV requested a five-man TDY Marine augmentation consisting of one security officer and four enlisted men.<sup>13</sup> This request was approved by CINCPAC and the individuals ordered TDY pending change to SOG JTN and the arrival of PCS personnel.<sup>14</sup> During the same period it became increasingly apparent that in order to maintain a twenty-four hour per day capability, the SOG Communications Branch strength was not sufficient to meet SOG needs for increased support requirements without further augmentations. Accordingly, on 17 August a letter was dispatched to CINCPAC requesting an increase of three officers and fourteen enlisted personnel for these two activities. Upon approval by JCS, two officers and four men of this increase were to be transferred to Headquarters, USMACV, ACSI, DA, TD. This change was approved as submitted.<sup>15</sup>

8. In August of 1964 it became necessary to request an increase to the fifteen man Mobile Training Team (MTT) at Camp Long Thanh. The fact that the operations and activities of SOG were steadily increasing, plus the experience gained from six months operations, indicated that a larger and more diversified Mobile Training Team was needed to conduct the training at Long Thanh. As a result of this decision, a message was dispatched requesting the strength of the MTT be increased to twenty-one.

13 (S) MACJOT msg 5036 DTG 130911Z JUL 1964

14 (S) CINCPAC msg 132331Z JUL 1964

LIMDIS

15 (S) JCS msg 141225Z SEP 1964

16 (S) MACSOG msg 7225 DTG 010705 AUG 1964

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PART II

OPERATIONS

BACKGROUND POLICY MATTERS

1. COMUSMACV summarized significant matters resulting from the March 1964 visit of Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor for dissemination to commanders.<sup>1</sup> Among other things decisions were made as follows:

a. Continue to carry out currently approved actions under OPLAN 34A. Do not, however, desire to tie up or withdraw Republic of Vietnam (RVN) assets needed for prosecution of the counterinsurgency effort.

b. Order has already been issued to proceed with the aerial mine laying training of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).

c. In this same message, it was pointed out that following guidance was provided:

(1) To hold in Vietnam is fundamental and we should concentrate on fundamentals and avoid diverting our time and efforts on peripheral issues.

(2) In the execution of approved actions under OPLAN 34A we should not press RVN to put over-riding priority on resources they require for successful prosecution of the counterinsurgency effort. U.S. resources will be made available.

(3) Look with disfavor on introduction of B-57's at this time. Will review again in case of step-up of 34A.

I (S) COMUSMACV 111031Z MAR 1964



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(4) Approved actions under OPLAN 34A constitutes a desirable but not fundamental program from the Washington point of view.

BACKGROUND POLICY MATTERS

SUBJECT: Implementation of South Vietnam Programs

2. After the visit to South Vietnam (SVN), in March, by Secretary McNamara and General Taylor a report was made to the National Security Council. The report was considered and approved by the President at a meeting of the National Security Council on 17 March. A message from JCS to CNEPAC and COMUSMACV stated that the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs had been designated to coordinate the execution of the recommendations contained in the report.<sup>2</sup> Pertinent portions of this 32 page message are extracted and outlined below.

a. U.S. Objectives in SVN: We seek an independent non-communist SVN. (A brief rationale for this objective was given and it was emphasized that the stakes were high insofar as foreign aid was concerned.)

b. Present U.S. Policy in SVN:

(1) Help SVN defeat the Viet Cong (VC) by means short of unqualified of U.S. forces.

(2) We are acting against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) by a very modest [REDACTED] which is so limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect. (U.S. policy in Laos and [REDACTED] was touched on.)

<sup>2</sup> (S) JCS SACS 131522Z March 1964 (SSG COMUSMACV)

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c. Present Situation in SVN:

- (1) SVN/U.S. governments military tools and concepts still sound.
- (2) Substantially more can be done militarily, civic action, and economically.
- (3) Turnover more responsibilities to SVN if possible.
- (4) U.S. will continue to reiterate that the Vietnamese must help themselves but we will continue assistance.
- (5) Situation is growing worse: Less government control of country side, apathy, political structure is weakening; NVN support is growing.
- (6) Weakest point is the uncertain viability of Khanh Government.
- (7) Positive side: Khanh Government responsive to U.S. advice.

d. Alternative Present Courses:

- (1) Negotiate the basis of neutralization: This is impossible- would mean communist takeover of SVN.
- (2) Initiate Governments of SVN and U.S. actions against DRV:
  - (a) Border control actions.
  - (b) Retaliatory actions - reconnaissance, bombing, strikes and commando raids, aerial mining.
  - (c) Graduated overt military pressure by the Governments of SVN and U.S. (this consideration was considered as untimely).
- (3) Initiate measures to improve situation SVN:

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(a) Emphasize at all levels that we are prepared to continue assistance.

(b) Continue to support Khanh Government.

(c) Support fully the pacification plan.

(d) Place the nation on a war footing - mobilize.

(e) Increase the armed forces by 50,000 men.

(f) Develop a civil administration corps.

(g) Improve and reorganize the paramilitary forces.

(h) Create an offensive guerrilla force to operate along the border and in areas where VC control is dominant. Organize along grounds of present Ranger companies and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Special Forces with special training and advice by U.S. Special Forces.

(i) Strengthen the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) by exchanging A-1H's for T-28's.

(j) Exchange M-114 armored personnel carrier with M-113's and provide additional river boats.

(k) Expand and publicly announce the fertilizer program. (Following the above considerations, a brief discussion of costs was presented and conclusions were made with the recommendation that this course of action should be pursued urgently.)

e. Possible Later Actions:

(1) Be prepared to mount new and significant pressures against NVN.

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(a) Develop a capability to initiate border control actions within 72 hours.

(b) Achieve a capability to initiate within 30 days notice the program of graduated overt military pressure.

(c) Grant authority immediately for [REDACTED] Vietnamese operations into Laos. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

f. Other Actions Considered but Rejected:

- (1) Return of dependents. Continue present policy.
- (2) Furnish a U.S. combat unit to defend Saigon. (Rationale is that this would have an adverse psychological effect.)
- (3) U.S. take over command.

g. Recommendations. That the President instruct appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government to:

- (1) Make clear our resolve to continue support.
- (2) Make clear that we support Khanh and disapprove of any further coups.
- (3) Support a national mobilization program.
- (4) Assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces.
- (5) Assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla force.
- (6) Assist the Vietnamese to create an enlarged administrative corps.
- (7) Assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize para-military forces and to increase their compensation.
- (8) Provide 25 A-1H's in exchange for T-28's.

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~~MEMOS~~

(9) Provide additional H-113's (Withdraw M-114's), additional river boats and 5-10 million additional material.

(10) Announce publicly the fertilizer program and triple the amount made available.

(11) Authorize continued high level U.S. overflights of SVN's borders and to authorize "Hot Pursuit" and SVN operations over Laotian line.

(12) Be prepared on 72 hour notice to initiate full range of Laotian border control actions and to be on 30 days notice to initiate the program of graduated overt military pressure against NVN.

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~~MEMOS~~

II-7 to II-23

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PART III  
AIR OPERATIONS

AIRCRAFT

1. As a result of Secretary of Defense visit to FV, a program was established to modify [redacted] aircraft for S&C use. The designated project name assigned was [redacted] program. [redacted] non-standard additional items to be installed were [redacted] The aircraft was initially assigned to the 2d Air Division. Further, the 2d Air Division would assign maintenance personnel who would support the program. MACSOG advised CINCPAC of the status of arrangements to support the [redacted] project and where the source of aircraft would be drawn.<sup>1</sup>

[redacted]

2. CINCPAC advised that the [redacted] aircraft were still in the going modification for installation of S&C equipment with [redacted] aircraft due out [redacted] 15 April and last wave of July 1961. [redacted] pointed out that MACSOG directed that the above schedule be [redacted]

3. CINCPAC advised that the [redacted] [redacted] modification [redacted] would be stepped up and [redacted] would be proposed as follows:<sup>1</sup>

1 (S) MACSOG 050710Z Feb 61

3 (S) CINCPAC 070327 Feb 61

2 CINCPAC 070518Z Feb 61 (S)

4 (S) CINCPAC 121327 Feb 61

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140015

[redacted]

#1 - 15 April 1964

#1 - 01 June 1964

#2 - 05 May 1964

#5 - 13 June 1964

#3 - 19 May 1964

#6 - 21 June 1964

4. MACS01 3853/140700Z May64 queried JCS on what had to be done to

[REDACTED] OPLAN 34A aircraft. JCS responded with JCS 201944Z May64 which indicated that COMUSMACV seek out [REDACTED] to the operations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MACS01 presented guidelines for [REDACTED] Further, it was recommended that the two bound [REDACTED] aircraft be delivered to [REDACTED] and held there until [REDACTED] problem was solved. Consequently, only one aircraft was brought into RVN [REDACTED] for the purpose of evaluating the non-standard equipment which modified [REDACTED] aircraft. The message also pointed out that the maintenance problem had not been resolved.

5. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 15 June 1964.<sup>6</sup> CSAR [REDACTED] advised that the second increment of three aircraft would depart Thailand on 27 July 1964 and arrive at [REDACTED] on 3 August 1964.<sup>7</sup> The first [REDACTED] aircraft arrived in RVN unmodified on 20 June 1964. The last [REDACTED] aircraft arrived in RVN on 26 November 1964.

5 (S) MACS01 5002/170005Z Jun64;

6 (S) CSAR 84962/052140Z Jun64

7 (S) CSAR 271650Z Jul64

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6. CHANGES on each page

THE 190 days effective 15 June 1964 for purpose of furnishing technical assistance on [REDACTED] in CUBA arrived Headquarters on

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[redacted] had not arrived in RVN and that his assistance was urgently needed for Doppler Navigational System. Also, that organization of assignment for [redacted] was required so that his AF Form 865 could be certified. On 27 July, Headquarters, AFLE informed MACV that [redacted] would replace [redacted] who would be departing RVN on about 10 August 1966.

7. On 22 July 1964, the 2d Air Division advised certain interested Air Force agencies that Major [REDACTED] assigned to MACV J2 should be added as an additional addressee on [REDACTED] messages.

8. MACSOG advised CINCPAC that an immediate requirement existed at [REDACTED] aircraft to be made available for crew housing.<sup>8</sup> The message listed the urgent required modifications and also requested the AFMCG sterilization concept be approved. AFMCG passed instructions to AFMCG for modification of [REDACTED] aircraft. MACSOG again reported (CINCPACAF) that [REDACTED] aircraft be made available and also suggested that possibly [REDACTED] could be used to modify the aircraft.<sup>9</sup> CINCPACAF gave approval to have three aircraft

8 (9) NALSGG 7357/C/O/534 2003b

9 (S) 100500 7540/072262 Aug 62

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to RVN for commencement of training. The message indicated that the required modifications were accomplished in COMUS, <sup>10</sup>

9. The maintenance contract still had not been resolved by following up. Consequently, MACS'D requested that a decision be made as to who would provide the required maintenance for the [REDACTED] 1

10. CINCPACAF OGCOSZ Aug 61

11. MACS.G 3310/151021Z Aug 61

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LEADS

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[REDACTED]

10. When an evaluation of [REDACTED] aircraft was completed in 1971, additional requests for modifications were submitted. MACS-1 requested that arrangements be made to install an audio capability to the [REDACTED] equipment. CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF to expedite COMUSMACV 230950Z Nov 61 request.

11. Prior to the arrival of [REDACTED] aircraft in RVN, it was determined that [REDACTED] aircraft was unsatisfactory to conduct NV search flights within the scope of PLAN 34A. MACS-1 advised CINCPAC of the unsuitability of [REDACTED] aircraft. CINCPAC requested more data on the desired requirements for a more adapted aircraft.<sup>23</sup> MACS-1 anticipated requirements.<sup>24</sup> CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's [REDACTED]

12. On 1 November 1961, [REDACTED] aircraft was [REDACTED] maintenance when both engines malfunctioned resulting in [REDACTED] aircraft at sea. On 10 December 1961, another [REDACTED] on a night air drop

21 CINCPAC 280502Z Nov 61

22 MACS-1 3171/150805Z Aug 61

23 CINCPAC 162213Z Sep 61

24 MACS-1 152300Z Sep 61

25 CINCPAC 012001Z Oct 61

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training mission flew into a mountain northeast of [REDACTED]. The aircraft was a complete loss with all personnel perishing in the accident. MACSCC advised that in view of the two losses, the time was ripe to push for a more suitable aircraft.<sup>26</sup> Further, it requested that until a suitable aircraft or replacement aircraft became available, that assistance be obtained from the 2d Air Division regarding loaning two unmodified aircraft to continue air crew training program. As a result of the above message, 2d Air Division was directed to provide two aircraft to MACSCC with certain restrictions.

26 MACSCC 17593/160911Z Dec 64


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PAGE IV

Maritime Operations- Historical Summary

- I Operations Summary
- II Crews for Maritime Craft
- III PTF Delivery Schedule
- IV PTF Maintenance
- V PTF Support
- VI  defense
- VII PTF-1 and PTF-2 Dispositions
- VIII Shift Status
- IX PTF Lease

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Maritime Operations

I. Operations Summary:

1. Maritime Operations Section of JCE, functioning as the staff component of USMACV, commenced formal operations in February 1964 with unsuccessful swimmer attacks against [redacted] and [redacted] at [redacted] on 16 February 1964. They were followed by a similarly unsuccessful swimmer attack at [redacted] and two aborted actions against [redacted]. A total of eight action personnel were lost on these operations.

2. The first in a planned series of RVN fishing junk captures, named operation [redacted], was successfully executed off [redacted] on 27 May.

[redacted] Three successive team actions resulted in destruction of a storage facility at [redacted] 12 June, demolishing a [redacted] bridge in the vicinity of [redacted] on 26 June, and damage to the [redacted] pump house on 30 June. On 26 June, defection offers to RVN [redacted] captains were placed in lighted buoys off [redacted] naval bases in support of psychological operations concept "Operation Lure."

3. [redacted] were successful on 9 and 25 July respectively. A team action against the [redacted] security post on 15 July was aborted in the objective area, with loss of two team members.

4. At this stage of operations, with Navy adapted 81 mm mortars installed on PTF's 7 and 8 (recently arrived at [redacted]), it was decided to initiate the already programmed bombardment concept in support of

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OPLAN 34A, commencing with utilization of 57-mm PLG rounds from the deck of PTF's and later expanding to the 61-mm mortars. The first bombardments on 30 July, utilized PTF's 2 and 5 against [REDACTED] (Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) [REDACTED]), and PTF's 3 and 6 against [REDACTED] (OTC [REDACTED]). These missions were well executed and highly successful, with secondary explosions at [REDACTED] and enemy resistance encountered at [REDACTED].

5. In July MACV set up July-August [REDACTED] patrol coordination procedures, indicating [REDACTED] Maritime Operations compatibility, provided MACV always had accurate knowledge of [REDACTED] whereabouts.<sup>2</sup> On 31 July a DeSoto [REDACTED] patrol entered the [REDACTED] which made it necessary to schedule maritime operations during this period no sooner than 36 hours after passage of the [REDACTED] ship in any specific area.

6. Dates for proposed bombardments against [REDACTED] radar and [REDACTED] security post were adjusted to conform and the actions were executed on 3 August.<sup>3</sup> PTF-6 reported many fires upon departure from [REDACTED] bombardment and as a result of the [REDACTED] bombardment by PTF's 2 and 5, [REDACTED] radar was off the air for an approximate period of at least five days. During this action, [REDACTED] patrol was in the northern reaches of the [REDACTED] and to insure non-interference, was requested by CUSMACV not to proceed below [REDACTED] during the night of 3-4 August.

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1 MACSOG 070253Z Aug 64

2 MACSOG 192241Z Jul 64

3 MACSOG 040955Z Aug 64

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LIMITS

[REDACTED]

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7. The ensuing attack by RV motor torpedo boats against [REDACTED] patrol ships on the night of 4 August precipitated a stand-down of maritime operations in the [REDACTED] ordered by JCS, which was eventually to result in no boat activity [REDACTED] for a two month period.

To preclude loss of craft from possible reprisal effort by [REDACTED] Air and/or Naval elements immediately following the 4 August incident, the eight PTF's deployed to [REDACTED] on 5 August with combined US/VN crew members on board (VLC CTC [REDACTED] and Senior US Advisor-Lt(jg) [REDACTED]). Overall staff coordination for the deployment was supervised by the Chief, Maritime Operations Section of SCS (Cdr [REDACTED]) and on-scene liaison was effected by Lt(jg) [REDACTED] and Lt(jg) [REDACTED]. All craft returned to [REDACTED] by 10 August.

8. In August JCS requested testing of a 106-mm RR on board a PTF for possible use as a standoff weapon with sufficient range to reach some inland targets not attainable with the 81-mm mortar. The ordnance was obtained from [REDACTED] along with suitable supervisory personnel and complete tests were conducted over a period of several weeks. Resulting shock damage to PTF components, indicated unsatisfactory capability of employment of the 106-mm RR in this manner and this was reported to JCS.

9. On 12 August CINCPACFLT requested COMSEVENTHFLT plan for aircraft cover of a maritime operations probe into the [REDACTED] utilizing Seventh Fleet EC-121 following [REDACTED] tracks. Plans were developed by COMSEVENTHFLT and MACSUG for two such coordinated missions

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IV-4

[REDACTED]



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scheduled for 28 and 31 August.<sup>4</sup> At this time, it was felt appropriate that a set of communication and recognition signals be developed for use in case of emergency procedures between units of the Seventh Fleet and 304 craft. The first set of signals was to be promulgated on 23 August by MACSOG and incorporated the already existing two letter recognition signals, developed in July for use between Coastal Security Service (CSS)/VNN craft in I Corps coastal waters by the Naval Advisory Group. The proposed missions were eventually passed over by events and did not materialize. However, the significance of the emergency procedures developed at this time was to be confirmed by examples of their future usefulness.<sup>5</sup>

10. Higher authority decided upon VNAF vice US air cover for Maritime operations [REDACTED] only. Accordingly, NAD installed A-1/ARC-27 in PTF's for A-1H compatibility and conducted training with VNAF A-1H controlled by S-123 aircraft.

11. During late August, an accidental rocket launcher explosion resulting in injury of a SEAL team member at [REDACTED] prompted CMCPCAF to initiate action to assist in testing/development and procurement of all operational ordnance items.<sup>6</sup>

12. JCS authorized resumption of maritime operations and requested schedule submission by 12 September.<sup>7</sup> A five day [REDACTED] was scheduled

4 MACSOG 130045Z Aug64

6 CMCPCAF 250451Z Aug64

5 MACSOG 230204Z Aug64

7 JCS 101804Z Sep64

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for commencement 17 September. MACSOG submitted eight proposed operations to run over a 13 day period commencing 23 hours after the [REDACTED] cleared the [REDACTED] (22 September).<sup>8</sup>

13. [REDACTED] Maritime Operations delayed due to weather and on 21 September all PTF's deployed to [REDACTED] to evade typhoon Tilda, returning 23 September. [REDACTED] was deferred indefinitely. Maritime operations 16 day probe off [REDACTED] further delayed by typhoon Anita and residual [REDACTED] was finally conducted 3 October.

14. At CINCPAC suggestion, DU/PTF training plan was formulated and fixed during CTG 70.8 representatives (Cin [REDACTED] visit to USNAD, with USNAD providing PTF's for one-time identity training exercise, which eventually expanded into formal continuing training.<sup>9</sup> CS3 emergency communication and recognition procedures were promulgated in final format on 4 October.<sup>10</sup>

15. Maritime operations missions for approximately one and one-half month period were forwarded per JCS request on a time schedule format. All missions were to be launched only upon JCS case by case evaluation of previous mission and JCS authorization.<sup>11</sup>

16. CTG 70.8 suspension of maritime operations PTF services resulted in MACSOG deferment of services until schedule was submitted via MACV and cleared. MACSOG proposal for orderly scheduling was concurred in and reiterated by COMSEVENTHFLT, and PTF services resumed.<sup>12</sup>

8 MACSOG 111741Z Sep64

11 JCS 270813Z Sep64

9 CTG 70.8 281525Z Sep64

12 COMSEVENTHFLT 090721Z Oct64

10 MACV 040620Z Oct64

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17. After several aborts, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was conducted 10 October, and [REDACTED] was conducted 15 October with capture. [REDACTED] bombardment was delayed due erroneous photo interpretation reading indicating motor torpedo boats plus weapons. It was successfully conducted 28 October.

18. In order to take advantage of few days of periodic good weather during the northeast monsoon, maritime operations announced submission of several final OPLANs for successive conduct.<sup>13</sup> Operations were restricted [REDACTED] by message through special communication channels due to higher authority concern over RV reaction capability.

19. In view expanding interest in maritime operations, MACV requested CINCPAC distribute emergency procedures to additional addressees including PACAF.<sup>14</sup>

20. MACV conducted a six boat naval bombardment of [REDACTED] on 26 November, and four naval boat bombardments of [REDACTED] on 27 November and [REDACTED] on 3 December.

21. The [REDACTED] naval bombardment was aborted in the target area due to RV naval order of battle on 1 and 22 December and aborted after [REDACTED] weather. December operations were dominated by unfavorable weather and monsoon weather.

22. MACV requested the presence of US naval vessels substituted [REDACTED] in anti-RV presence in the GOF for psychological [REDACTED] weather periods that preclude maritime operations.<sup>15</sup>

13 MACV 090815Z Nov61

14 MACV 252330Z Nov61

15 MACV 090927Z Dec61

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[REDACTED]

23. Approval for [REDACTED] mission as a corollary task supports are granted for conduct.<sup>16</sup> Request for case-by-case windfall TIR of task against anchored/disabled HLF craft and vulnerable windfall beach targets was approved.<sup>17</sup>

24. JCS proposed two package mission concepts with package one to run from approximately 15 December through 15 January and package two thereafter, with provision for US air cover in package two.<sup>18</sup>

HAGV proposed use of existing USS emergency procedures; COMSANTFLT suggested evaluation of procedures, and CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT requested MACV/COMSANTFLT test.<sup>19</sup> MACV, meanwhile, laid down provisions for conduct of training; due to intensive use of FIF's in favorable periods of monsoon weather.<sup>20</sup>

25. JCS was informed of intent to launch concepts (valid each day if weather favorable) until continuous good weather prevails.<sup>21</sup>

26. MACSOG granted authority to COMSANTFLT to downgrade emergency procedure extracts to Secret for training. CEB 70.6 proposed ET/TF training air/surface tactics on continuing basis. MACSOG authorized in DD/TF aircraft tactics training, plus emergency procedures training returning FIF's for mission below 17 degrees north.<sup>22</sup>

16 MACSOG 030325Z Dec 61

20 MACSOG 110752Z Dec 61

17 MACSOG 050325Z Dec 61

21 MACSOG 260337Z Dec 61

18 JCS 022320Z Dec 61

22 MACSOG 251011Z Dec 61

19 MACSOG 050215Z Dec 61

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22. CRIMS FOR MARITIME CRAFT

1. On 18 January 1964, General [REDACTED] dispatched letter (MACSOG 0061-64) to Major General [REDACTED] RVN, concurring in his proposal to raise the manning in the VNM from 45 to 145 men during 1964 to support the boat requirements.

2. On 27 January 1964, General [REDACTED] dispatched another letter to General [REDACTED] (MACSOG 0062-64) informing him that there would be a total of eight boats and listed personnel requirements for the six additional boats. Dates for crew availability were listed as follows:

- a. Crew requirements: 1 March: 30
- b. Crew requirements: 15 April: 30
- c. Crew requirements: 15 May: 30
- d. Supervisory personnel as soon as possible: Seven officers.

3. On 12 February 1964, General [REDACTED] dispatched letter (MACSOG 0059-64) to General [REDACTED] outlining the same requirements as those forwarded to General [REDACTED] with the additional requirement for 40 action team personnel.

4. The following personnel reported for duty with Mobile Support Team (MST) as boat training teams for FTF's 3 and 4: <sup>23</sup>

[REDACTED]

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On 21 April the following personnel reported to MST-1-61 for duty with boat training teams 5 and 6:

[REDACTED]

6. On 3 May PTF's 5 and 6 arrived and the crews (spares from PTF's 3 and 4) commenced training. PTF-5 was operational ready 7 June, and PTF-6 was operational ready 24 June.

7. On 10 June 1964, Chief, SSG forwarded a letter to COMUSMACV requesting two complete crews for PTF's 7 and 8. The letter was prepared for forwarding official requests to General [REDACTED] although CMO, VNA, had agreed to provide such crews. Colonel [REDACTED] coordination was obtained on the letter. On 22 June, General [REDACTED] replied that he had discussed the requirement with General [REDACTED] that the latter had approved our request.<sup>24</sup>

8. On 27 April the following personnel reported to MST-1-61 for duty with boat training teams 7 and 8:

[REDACTED]

9. PTF's 7 and 8 with VNA crews arrived and commenced training 7 July. Both crews were operational ready by mid-August.

10. On 28 August, General [REDACTED] dispatched a letter to [REDACTED] (Subj: Personnel). Among other requests, this letter requested the VNA provide PTF Crew 9 as a spare crew.

24. MACV Ltr 00465-64

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IX. PTF DELIVERY SCHEDULE

1. [REDACTED] stated PTF-3 was delivered 102400Z. [REDACTED] attempted to confirm delivery of PTF's 5 and 6 as on or about 14 May with COMNAVBASE SUBIC.<sup>26</sup>

2. COMGPACFLT stated PTF's 1 and 2 plus pontoon dock, crane barge, and tender being readied at [REDACTED] for delivery to [REDACTED]. The anticipated delivery of the PTF's was 22-24 April.<sup>27</sup>

3. In answer to a query by COMUSMACV, Seventh Fleet, COMNAVBASE SUBIC informed as to the following proposed PTF shipping dates:

- a. 13 April: Pontoon drydock, crane, and tender barge.
- b. 20 April: PTF's 1 and 2.
- c. 1 May: PTF's 5 and 6; return PTFs 3 and 4 to Subic Bay fuel tank improvement.
- d. 20 May: Return PTF's 3 and 4 to Danang.
- e. 20 June: PTF's 7 and 8.<sup>28</sup>

4. On 20 April CTF 76 informed MACV and others of following revised PTF delivery schedule via [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

- a. 26 April: PTF's 1 and 2 to [REDACTED]
- b. 14 May: PTF's 5 and 6 to [REDACTED]
- c. 15 May: PTF's 3 and 4 for Subic Bay; return [REDACTED] Pres.
- d. 23 June: PTF's 7 and 8 to [REDACTED]<sup>29</sup>

5. COMGPACFLT requested evaluation of PTF's 1 and 2 for delivery

[REDACTED]

26 PACSTO 050805Z May64

[REDACTED]

29 CTF 76 260852Z April64

27 COMGPACFLT 270024Z March64

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

different characteristics and recommendation as to whether they should be removed from Vietnam.<sup>30</sup>

6. MACSOG requested CINCPACFLT to delay delivery of PTF's 7 and 8 until on or about 15 July due to slippage in docking facilities and fuel farm system.<sup>31</sup> This would also permit noise level tests on these boats and input of VNA crews which are scheduled arrive [REDACTED] July. COMSEVENTHFLT agreed to the above request and stated that [REDACTED] could make required delivery or, if further slippage was required, [REDACTED] could make delivery about 15 August. In reply, MACSOG stated delivery on 7 July was desired. Accordingly, CINCPACFLT established 7 July as delivery date.

7. In response to JCS query, COMUSMACV stated five additional PTF's were needed; two to replace PTF's 1 and 2 with three additional PTF back-up in Subic.<sup>32</sup>

8. CINCPACFLT stated four new PTF's were due [REDACTED] January-March 1965.<sup>33</sup>

30 CINCPACFLT 190301Z May64

32 MACSOG 071039Z Aug64

31 MACSOG 160259Z Jun64

33 CINCPACFLT 212039Z Nov64

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LEADS  
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[REDACTED]



17. PTF MAINTENANCE

1. In March 1964 MACSOG advised [REDACTED] that fuel oil tank #9 ruptured along a weld on its outboard side. Also, Tanks #2 and #9 shifted fore and aft due to loose strapping. Further, new tanks #2, #3, and #9 vertically buckled on the inboard side about the horizontal weld. MACSOG evaluation was that new tanks with square stiffeners do not provide sufficient strength for securing without modification. It was recommended that a representative [REDACTED] visit [REDACTED] to solve the problem.

2. According to the above request, a [REDACTED] representative visited [REDACTED] and reported findings recommending installation of new tanks manufactured in Cuba on PTF's 3 through 6.

3. CINCPACFLT passed fuel tank problems to CINCPAC and USHIBPAC and informed all that the installation recommendation in paragraph 2 above was underway.<sup>34</sup>

4. NAVSHINTRANS, [REDACTED] notified USHIBPAC that the #2003 fuel pump on PTF 2 tumbled during high accelerations or heavy pounding. Similar problems encountered in PTF 1 were solved by a change to HCB 9-1 pump. Early resolution of problem was requested.

5. MACSOG informed [REDACTED] that the quill saline shaft secured #1 engine on PTF 1 and #4 engine on PTF 2. Spare parts from PTF 1 were cannibalized to make PTF 1 operational.

6. MACSOG requested that enlarged heat exchangers be installed [REDACTED] for PTF's 3 and 4. Another query was dispatched to [REDACTED].

34 CINCPACFLT 320402Z March

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to plans for installing heat exchangers on PTF's 3 and 4 as well as PTF's 5 and 6, which had arrived without exchangers.

7. MACSOG advised [REDACTED] that the starboard engine on PTF 3 failed to turnover and that coolant water was found in engine block. <sup>35</sup> Repairs were beyond capability of HBT and the engine would be returned to [REDACTED] Engines had 200 hours time, serial 523, installed in [REDACTED] with one year guarantee or 750 running hours. Further message requested status of spare delta engines at Subic.

8. MACSOG expressed concern to [REDACTED] with high noise level of the PTF's. In reply [REDACTED] stated that the turbo-supercharger is the major source of boat noise, exhaust noise being reduced to minimum by exhaust through an eight inch pipe. Further isolation of super-charger noise was not considered practical by manufacturer's representative.

9. On 21 May, MACSOG advised CINCPACFLT that PTF engine noise was excessive and requested authority to conduct initial investigation on PTF's 7 and 8 to determine feasibility of an economical lightweight installation designed to reduce engine noise level. <sup>36</sup>

10. CINCPACFLT passed MACSOG's desires to BUSHIPS requesting comments and recommendations. Accordingly, BUSHIPS advised [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] conducting tests provided [REDACTED] representative concern that any solution considered would not adversely affect engine performance.

11. MACSOG advised [REDACTED] 9 June that it appeared that other tests would be drawn out and that delay of delivery of PTF's was not acceptable. <sup>37</sup>

35 MACSOG 280551Z Apr 64

37 MACSOG 090922Z Jun 64

36 MACSOG 210040Z May 64

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12. MACSOT proposed to commence overhaul of PTFs by starting with PTF 3, sea lifting it from [REDACTED] approximately 1 December 1964 to [REDACTED]. MACSOT further stated overhaul schedule of first four PTFs should be based on overhaul experience for PTF 3. Overhaul was estimated to be 30 days.

[REDACTED]

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1. COMNAVPHIL passed the following arrangement for support of PTFs in WESTPAC.<sup>38</sup>

a. PTF administrative/logistical support and repair/maintenance function for PTFs in [REDACTED] were delegated to [REDACTED] in accordance with CINCPACFLT.<sup>39</sup>

b. PTF administrative/logistical function for PTFs in RVN were delegated to [REDACTED] in accordance with CINCPACFLT.<sup>39</sup>

c. Assignments of governing procedures and responsibilities for PTF support were established by CINCPACFLT.<sup>40</sup>

2. In order to clarify responsibilities CINCPACFLT informed COMNAVPHIL and COMSEVENTHFLT that the responsibility for assembly of drydock package, supervising instruction of personnel, evaluation of number of propulsion units required for crane barge, preparation for movement to, and mooring at, final site and administrative/logistical functions for pontoon package in RVN was assigned to COMNAVPHIL vice COMSEVENTHFLT.<sup>41</sup> COMSEVENTHFLT would continue provide assembly personnel and drydock transportation to mooring site.

3. CINCPACFLT requested information from MACSOG as to arrangements for refueling PTF's 1 and 2 with AVGAS.

4. MACSOG advised CINCPACFLT that an interim measure for refueling PTF's 1 and 2 would be by AVGAS truck on the beach as a base, with craft moored 100 yards offshore.<sup>42</sup> Also, MACSOG stated that fuel from completion

38 COMNAVPHIL 021031Z March

41 CINCPACFLT 120139Z March

39 CINCPACFLT 280242Z Feb64

42 MACSOG 020702Z April

40 CINCPACFLT 142157Z Feb64

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[REDACTED]

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might be delayed if resolution of funding problem by higher authority is not forthcoming soon. A contract with low bidder also was completed but not signed. ESSO required a contract and estimated six weeks for completion after receipt of contract.

5. CINCPACFLT indicated readiness to assist in test, development, and procurement of special PTF ordnance support materials if requirements were made known.<sup>43</sup> These requirements were provided by the following two messages:

<u>MESSAGE</u>	<u>REQUIREMENT</u>
MACSOG 271112Z Aug64	PTF attachment.
MACSOG 281151Z Aug64	Underwater vision material.
MACSOG 010713Z Sep64	Over the beach material.

6. MACSOG confirmed to CINCPAC a requirement for a T-21, surface propulsion unit.<sup>44</sup>

7. MACSOG reviewed and restated prior voluminous message traffic on PTF ordnance support requirements.<sup>45</sup>

8. CINCPACFLT scheduled a Navy-wide maritime operations equipment conference at ~~██████████~~ for 12-13 October which was attended by MACSOG, of Operations, Maritime Operations, and Pacific Logistics. As a result of the conference, general maritime operations support problem areas were identified. As a result, MAC weekly summaries of significant unfilled requirements were sent to CINCPACFLT for information. These unfilled requirements related to not only maritime operations ordnance equipment but also to general PTF support material and PTF (AST) support material.

43 CINCPACFLT 250451Z Aug64

45 MACSOG 190302Z Sep64

44 MACSOG 140812Z Sep64

46 CINCPACFLT 080002Z Sep64

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11-17

9. MACSOG requested CINCPACFLT assistance in:
- providing FTF radar/gyro parts.
  - Providing Bataan radar coal and coal stocks.
  - Shortening lead times in responding to FTF radar/gyro repair and repair part needs.
  - Expediting procurement and [redacted] delivery of FTF repair parts

MACSOG requested an enlisted electronics technicians at [redacted] to assist in overcoming electronics problems. <sup>48</sup> One was subsequently provided.

10. CINCPACFLT questioned whether significant FTF support degradation had occurred. <sup>49</sup> MACSOG replied that degradation had not occurred but that some repair parts problems existed which would be subject of SMC representative visit to [redacted] on 6 November 1964. <sup>50</sup>

11. CINCPACFLT recommended establishment of a JTF casualty reporting system to improve support. <sup>51</sup> MACSOG concurred and system placed in effect. <sup>52</sup>

12. MACSOG prepared wellbats for key maritime operations officers personnel at [redacted] to fulfill prescribed language, security, preparation briefing, and instruction requirements. <sup>53</sup>

13. MACSOG requested CINCPAC initiate Navy action to terminate breach of unclassified message references to "US FTF". <sup>54</sup> CINCPAC and implemented.

14. BUMAFB representatives [redacted] and team went to Bataan in solving radar and gyro problems. On 24 November installation of Bataan 202 radar was completed in Swifts plus FTF's J-8 and additional gyro material.

ordered from Subic. <sup>55</sup>

47 MACSOG 231120Z Oct 64  
48 MACSOG 280711Z Oct 64  
49 CINCPACFLT 021809Z Nov 64

50 MACSOG 050210Z Nov 64  
51 CINCPACFLT 030217Z Nov 64  
52 MACSOG 240711Z Nov 64

53 MACSOG 280322Z Nov 64  
54 MACSOG 280322Z Nov 64

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11/18  
IV-18

[redacted]

15. A favorable comparison was achieved between recently obtained T-34 SFU characteristics with previously stored SAC 40 required characteristics. A message stated special SFU maintenance personnel could return to COMUS and MAC personnel would maintain SFU's, cannibalizing two SFU's to keep the other four operational.

16. MACSOG received [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] letters which contained debriefs of SHF electrical, mechanical, and electronic inspections of PTF.<sup>55</sup> These letters requested authority to debrief MACSOG personnel in connection with PTF material support. MACSOG considered such authority already provided and requested that forthcoming [REDACTED] include improvement recommendations to MACSOG on:<sup>56</sup>

- a. Preventative maintenance.
- b. Engineering operating.
- c. Casualty control.
- d. [REDACTED] PTF logistical support.

[REDACTED]

56 MACSOG 311308Z Dec64

[REDACTED]

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VI. ~~██████████~~ HARBOR DEFENSE

1. In addition to ground security augmentations, MACSOG requested special support from CIO to improve ~~██████████~~ defenses.<sup>57</sup> Equipment arrived ~~██████████~~ in October 1964, and was unsatisfactory.

2. MACSOG requested CINCPACFLT representative, knowledgeable in harbor defense, to survey ~~██████████~~ defense needs and assist in arriving at an in-country resolution.<sup>58</sup>

3. CINCPAC requested concept (in event surface craft attack ~~██████████~~ for PTF role in passive protection or active defense.<sup>59</sup> MACSOG submitted the following concepts:<sup>60</sup>

a. Active:

- (1) Attack and deflect DRV craft wherever encountered.
- (2) Operate in assigned sections to avoid mistaken identity.
- (3) US OTC on PTFs involved in operations ~~██████████~~
- (4) If provided, use US/VN naval and air support with appropriate communications and coordination.

b. Passive:

- (1) Readiness of PTFs to increase alert or be alerted.
- (2) Surveillance by PTF/surface craft and base personnel for boat attack from land and sea.

4. MACSOG reported to CINCPAC that the CINCPACFLT survey was completed on 16 December with its report to be hand-processed to CINCPACFLT.<sup>61</sup> MACSOG also stated that some aspects of the survey were being implemented and that assistance would be requested from CINCPAC at a later date.

57 MACSOG 080945Z J-164  
58 MACSOG 021114Z Nov-64  
59 CINCPAC 122307Z Dec-64

60 MACSOG 261405Z Dec-64  
61 MACSOG 150807Z Dec-64

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VII. PTF 1 AND PTF 2 DISPOSITION

[REDACTED] requested firm decision on disposition of PTF 1 and PTF 2 in view of extreme difficulty [REDACTED] in providing supply and maintenance support.<sup>62</sup> Officer in Charge, [REDACTED] had previously recommended PTFs 1 and 2 be used in [REDACTED] security patrol, limited to operations/training missions in which PACSOG concurred, and that their status continue until the crews of PTFs 1 and 2 transferred to new PTFs at [REDACTED]<sup>63</sup>

62 [REDACTED]

63 OICG, HAD Ltr OCL5 of 7 Sep 1964/PACSOG 140735Z Dec64

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IV-21

[REDACTED]

IV-22

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IX. PTF LESSES

1. In October 1964, MACV G stated that the time was not ripe to lease PTFs to the Government of Vietnam; although G DO indication prior to JLA operations, PTFs should be leased.<sup>65</sup>

2. CINCPAC emphasized the need for MACV to complete the PTF leases.

3. COMUSMACV indicated lease discussions had progressed to point where CINCPAC legal assistance was required.<sup>66</sup>

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65 MACV G 021013Z Oct64

66 MACV G 150807Z Dec64

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V-1 to V-9

(9 pages)

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ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

1. The Intelligence Branch was formed in March 1964, with the arrival in SOG of the original Chief of Intelligence, an Air Force Lieutenant Col. [redacted]. In early April the three sections were formed and manned with a nucleus of three PCS and TDY personnel. Accomplishments of the sections were as follows:

a. Collections Section:

(1) Basic materials utilized by the branch were provided by the Collections Section. To this end, daily trips were made to J-2 Collections, J-2 Intelligence Library, Reconnaissance and Photo Intelligence, and GIC elements of the J-2 Staff, Headquarters, MACV. A smooth liaison was developed with the various sections of MACV J-2. In return SOG Intelligence provided J-2 MACV with information on Naval Order of Battle, Radar Order of Battle, AAA Order of Battle and military installations within the DRV and Laos.

(2) Photo reconnaissance support was provided by the [redacted] [redacted] at [redacted], and the [redacted] [redacted]. Coverage of areas of special SOG interest was requested from [redacted]. Artist sketches of selected installations were obtained from USARPAC.

(3) Certain intelligence collection operations were [redacted]

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EX-100  
VI-1

[redacted]

Excellent information was obtained on such various subjects as food prices, rationing, education, public health, religion, commerce, living conditions, travel restrictions, transportation, personnel documentation, voting, radio broadcasts, finances, fishing, city plans, reactions to SOG operations and militia and military organizations.

be the most extensive and valuable sociological information to come from the DRV in several years and it received wide dissemination for the use of the intelligence community.

b. Targets Section:

(1) The basic targets assigned to SOG were prepared by the Air Division and turned over to SOG Intelligence. In June 1964, the Targets Section started producing detailed photo intelligence reports (DPIR's). This program, by the end of December 1964, had produced some 50 plus new completed target reports. DPIR's included analyses and measurements of target areas and available beaches, terrain conditions and climate conditions. Also an analysis of enemy Ground Order of Battle and communication lines was included.

(2) In August 1964, the section devised a target reporting system to accommodate the unique requirements listed on the section. The system has divisions that catalog targets consisting of a one building complex holding over one hundred structures. It, therefore, provided a catalog not listed in the USAF Bombing Encyclopedia or any other reference publication.

LIMITS


VI-2

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During the remainder of FY 64, the major problem encountered in logistics support was that of obtaining adequate planning factors and financial guidance for developing operational support and budget plan for FY 65.



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On 10 June 1964, JOC established funding responsibility and amount, requested a price cut, and updated the FY 65 budget estimate.

Funding channels were to be through CMC, OI or AG, 1971 for standard military items

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VII-2

VII-2



VII-3 to VII-10

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1. J. C. V. Directive 100-62, dated 11 February 1962, provided basic logistic guidance to all units in the Republic of Vietnam. References for J. C. V. Directive 100-62 are as follows:

- a. J. C. V. Publication No. 2 (U)
- b. Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy Guide (JLPG) (Publication No. 3) (U)
- c. J. C. V. Instruction 604000.11 (U)
- d. J. C. V. Instruction 1450.1001 (U)
- e. Letter, J. C. V., Subj: Terms of Reference for J. C. V. AG, Vietnam dated 7 April 1962 (U)

2. Appendices which set forth the policy and procedures in greater detail were listed as follows:

<u>Appendix Number</u>	<u>J. C. V. Directive Number/Year</u>	<u>Appendices</u>
1	11/63	Disposition of Wounded
2	13/63	Personnel Administration Control
3	34/63	Loss of Personnel and Material
4	24/62	Levels of Supply (U)
5	16/62	J. C. V. Defense Landmarks Commission
6	39/62	Accounting & Reporting of Personnel & Material
7	53/63	US Forces Petroleum Support Administration
8	Letter	J. C. V. Letter, Disposal of Bodies of Personnel in Vietnam, 10 April 1962

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- 10 42/63 Administration of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Vietnam
- 11 53/63 Flight Regulation in the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Vietnam
- 12 55/63. Hospital Services of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Vietnam
- 12 56/62 Administrative Medicine and Hygiene Program, 1971
- 55/62 b. Prevention and Control of Venereal Diseases
- 60/62 c. Sanitary Inspection of Food Sources
- 9/63 d. Prevention & Control of Rabies
- 13 Transportation:
- 37/63 a. Combined Movements System in HCMC
- 42/63 b. Passengers in VI Military Aircraft
- 14 56/2 (44) c. Administrative Vehicle Utilization Data Development
- 15 d. Vehicle Development
- 37/63 a. Responsibility for, and Control of, Transportation
- Construction for VI Service, 1971
- 701-2(64) b. Construction of VI Military Aircraft
- 16 43/63 Construction and Control of the VI Military Aircraft
- VI Military Aircraft

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VII-12



II - B - 1 To II G - 2

(19 pages)

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TAB I (Helicopter Operations in Support of SOG/SIS) vs  
Airborne Operations Section Historical Summary

DF dated 4 August 1964

SUBJ: Helicopter Operations in Support of SOG

TO: Chief, SOG

FROM: Chief, Ops

1. References:

a. MACV letter, Subject: Operational Planning, Vietnam, dated 25 March 1964, included operations involving helicopter infiltration of airborne operation teams into southern areas of DRV. (TAB A).

b. CINCPAC letter, Serial OCOL49, Subject: Operational Planning, Vietnam, dated 18 April 1964, recommends against helicopter infiltration into DRV, stating that VNAF helicopters crews are not capable of conducting operations even in RVN without US assistance. (TAB B).

[REDACTED]

2. Purpose: To initiate action within MACV/RVNAF to develop a capability for helicopter infiltration of DRV prior to submitting a request to references 1b and c.

3. Discussion:

a. Reference 1b is not correct as stated. RVNAF H34 crews are daily conducting operations in RVN without direct US assistance. Some of these operations have approximated contemplated SOG operations in nature of terrain, navigational problems, and enemy situation. In 1961 and 1962, RVNAF H34's delivered numerous Special Forces teams into isolated

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET LINDS~~

areas of Laos. USAF advisors feel that with additional training in night operations, the RVNAF H34 crews can conduct infiltration operations into DRV as envisaged by the SCG within the Phase II time frame.

b. It is within RVNAF/MACV prerogatives to develop a night operational capability on the part of selected RVNAF H34 crews. This capability can be exploited for [REDACTED] operations within RVN as well as in support of [REDACTED] operations. In fact, [REDACTED] training for night operations into Viet Cong base areas should be the stated purpose of the proposed activity.

c. Once the capability is developed, MACV can reclaim the objections to helicopter infiltration and again propose that such operations be conducted. At present SCG has the following concept for helicopter infiltration:

(1) Targets: [REDACTED] and an infiltration route from the Viet Cong training center at [REDACTED]

(2) Infiltration/Exfiltration: Overflight of Laos is required. Teams can be landed or deployed by let down (winch or rappel) into the jungle. In the case of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After refueling of the mission helicopters, the escort helicopters return to RVN with the pathfinder team.

(3) Operations: Both hit-and-run and in-place team operations are possible. Helicopters may be also used to deliver delay or anti-disturbance fused explosives in large quantities.

~~TOP SECRET LINDS~~

d. The SOG would prefer that the trainee crew be attached to the SES during the training period. This was [REDACTED] coordination, joint development of operational techniques and procedures, and permit concurrent training of SES operational team personnel. It would also facilitate SOG control of the activity.

e. If the above proposal is approved, SOG would require temporary attachment of qualified US H34 instructors during the training period.

f. In view of the Chief of Staff's position that this matter be handled on a face-to-face basis between Chief, SOG and Chief, SES, the originally recommended letter could serve as a talking paper in such a discussion. Additional support for the recommendation is the success which VN Special Forces enjoyed in the recent exfiltration of teams from Laos. USCF personnel working on the project stated that helicopter crew performance was exceptionally high, and that at least six crews were capable, with additional training, of flying night infiltration and exfiltration missions.

4. Recommendation:

a. That Chief, SOG personally recommend to Chief, SES that the JCS be approached on the subject of developing a night helicopter capability to support SOG [REDACTED] operations in RV.

b. That the attached paper form the basis of discussion in presenting the recommendation.

1 Incl  
as

[REDACTED]  
Colonel, USMC  
Chief, Opns

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II-J-1 to II-K-2

(8 pages)



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LIMITS

TAB L (Explanations) to  
Airborne Operations Section Historical Summary

[REDACTED]

1. Sky conditions:
  - a. Clear: No clouds or just a few small puffs.
  - b. Scattered: Less than half the sky covered.
  - c. Broken: More than half covered but not completely covered.
  - d. Overcast: All sky is covered, or only a few small openings.
2. Cloud base height: Estimate height of bottom of cloud by comparing with other high objects such as mountains, etc.
3. Visibility: Estimate by how far you can see; check map for distance to most distant object seen.
4. Restrictions to visibility:
  - a. Haze: Dust particles suspended in the air.
  - b. Fog: Water droplets suspended in the air.
5. Wind speed (estimates):
  - a. Less than 1 Km/hr: Wind not felt on face, smoke goes straight up.
  - b. 1-5 Km/hr: Wind felt on face, leaves and small twigs rustle.
  - c. 5-16 Km/hr: Leaves and small twigs in constant motion; small branches move.
  - d. 17-30 Km/hr: Large branches and small trees sway, leaves are blown about. Smoke is parallel with ground.

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II-L-1

LIMITS

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~  
WEATHER MESSAGE  
(Format)

~~SECRET~~  
WEATHER CODE (SEE BELOW)

INDICATOR

WWW 24 1600Z Sample  
Date Time Group WW24 1600Z CCHAE CDUWW

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 W W  
Indicator

1. Sky Condition: (Continued para 3)
- a. Clear
  - b. Scattered
  - c. Broken
  - d. Overcast
  - e. 3
  - f. 4
  - g. 5
  - h. 6
2. Cloud Base Height:
- a. 0 Meters
  - b. 200
  - c. 400
  - d. 600
  - e. 800
  - f. 1000
  - g. 2000
  - h. 3000
  - i. 4000
  - j. 5000
  - k. Over 5000
  - l. 7
  - m. 8
  - n. 9
  - o. 10
  - p. Over 10
3. Visibility:
- a. 0 Kilometers
  - b. 1
  - c. 2
  - 4. Restrictions to Visibility:
    - a. Haze
    - b. Fog
    - c. Smoke
    - d. Rain
    - e. Thunderstorm
    - f. Hail
    - g. None
5. Wind Direction (Wind Blowing From):
- a. North 0 Degree
  - b. Northeast 45 Degrees

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II-L-2

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LIMDIS

(Continued para 5)

c. East 90 Degrees  
d. Southeast 135 Degrees  
e. South 180 Degrees  
f. Southwest 225 Degrees  
g. West 270 Degrees  
h. Northwest 315 Degrees

6. Wind Speed:

a. 2 Km/hr  
b. 4  
c. 6  
d. 9  
e. 10  
f. 15  
g. 20  
h. 25  
i. 30  
j. Over 30

9. Fog Forms At:

a. 0100Z  
b. 0200Z  
c. 0300Z  
d. 0400Z  
e. 0500Z  
f. 0600Z

(Continued in [REDACTED])

g. 0700Z  
h. 0800Z  
i. 0900Z  
j. 1000Z  
k. 1100Z  
l. 1200Z  
m. 1300Z  
n. 1400Z  
o. 1500Z  
p. 1600Z  
q. 1700Z  
r. 1800Z  
s. 1900Z  
t. 2000Z  
u. 2100Z  
v. 2200Z  
w. 2300Z  
x. 2400Z

8. Fog Lifts At:

a. 0100Z  
b. 0200Z  
c. 0300Z  
d. 0400Z  
e. 0500Z

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

LIMDIS

- f. 0600Z
- g. 0700Z
- h. 0800Z
- i. 0900Z
- j. 1000Z
- k. 1100Z
- l. 1200Z
- m. 1300Z
- n. 1400Z
- o. 1500Z
- p. 1600Z
- q. 1700Z
- r. 1800Z
- s. 1900Z
- t. 2000Z
- u. 2100Z
- v. 2200Z
- w. 2300Z
- x. 2400Z

II-L-4

[REDACTED]

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LIMDIS

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TAB M (Sergeant [REDACTED] to  
Airborne Operations Section Historical Summary

LIVINGS

[REDACTED]

Sergeant [REDACTED] the Assistant Security Battalion Advisor and Camp Intelligence Advisor, was killed in action at 1030, 16 November 1964. Portions of the security battalion were conducting a search and clear operation west of [REDACTED]. The unit was moving forward in approximately 20-man groups by multiple columns. Sergeant [REDACTED] group received automatic weapons fire when crossing a gully in an area known as "Viet Cong stronghold". Sergeant [REDACTED] was mortally wounded by the first burst. In the ensuing engagement Sergeant [REDACTED] was wounded in the shoulder. The Viet Cong were entrenched in a system of spider holes and interlocking trenches. The effects of an off shore typhoon caused evacuation by helicopter to be extremely hazardous. [REDACTED] the pilot, did a most skillful job in spite of the high winds and low ceiling. POW report indicated that the Viet Cong sustained 11 KIA and 21 WIA as a result of the engagement and ensuing 4.2 MI mortar fire. Sergeant [REDACTED] was posthumously awarded the Bronze Star.

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LIVINGS

[REDACTED]

II-M-1

II-N-1

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
SUBJECT: Parachute Operations

RE dated 10 Dec 64

TO: Air Force, Navy, Army, U.S. Air, Army, Navy  
FROM: Air Force

1. Reports from inspectors have indicated that present methods of landing are far from drop zones. Distances involved may be as far as 3000 meters. Some reports indicate from two to seven days before the bundles because of the rugged terrain and dense vegetation surrounding the drop zones.

2. The need for improved delivery accuracy is indicated. Present Delivery Officers as well as the crew training is involved. Present Delivery Officers have had no experience in employing dual, multi-sequence in conjunction with the parachute zig zag maneuver--delayed operations with 150 foot glider lines between canopy and bundle.

3. It is recommended:

a. That a series of drops be conducted in the future with (1) dropping of cargo with responsibility in the hands of the crew member.

(2) Including experience for Personnel in the hands of the crew member, and (3) dropping of cargo using the dual, multi-sequence system.

b. That a series of drops be conducted in the future with (1) dropping of cargo with responsibility in the hands of the crew member, and (2) dropping of cargo using the dual, multi-sequence system.

(1) As closely as possible approximate actual drop times include flying time.

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS

~~TOP SECRET~~ **LINDIS** [REDACTED]  
(2) Provide security to actual operations

local [REDACTED] and breaking up our hitherto consistent pattern of activity during light of moon periods only.

4. Comments are requested. Actual date for these operations will depend upon availability of aircraft.

[REDACTED]  
LtCol, Inf  
Chief, Abn Ops

II-C-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

**LINDIS** [REDACTED]



~~SECRET~~  
TAB P (4.5 Inch Rocket) to  
Airborne Operations Section Historical Summary

1. Nomenclature:

- a. Rocket HE comp B 4.5 inch T160M5 without fuze.
- b. Fuze MD M01A1 (quick and delay), VT M02A1.

2. Electrically fired; 40 pounds, MD-(quick) and delay fuze, or F fuze. Range 8400 yards.

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1965

R-04

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2 JUN 1966

Letter of  
Transmittal

OASD (PA) OFCISR

85-FOI-1364

88-TS-54

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SOG CONTROL # 0001720-66

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100-100-100

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100-100-100

100

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100-100-100

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100-100-100

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100-100-100

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100-100-100

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LIMDIS

(13) The VNAF H-34 helicopters were used for insertion and extraction of [redacted] teams into Laos and infiltration team [redacted] into NVN.

(14) The increased logistical support for SOG units resulted in an increase of tonnage and flying hours for the C-123s. The C-123s flew a total of 3,647 hours, and airlifted 828 tons of equipment.

d. Maritime:

(15) Coastal boat and landing team operations were conducted against the coast of North Vietnam to interdict enemy coastal shipping, capture prisoners for interrogations and psychological warfare exploitation, and to force North Vietnam to increase its coastal defenses.

(16) Six Navy Class PTFs (Patrol Torpedo Boats, Fast) and three SWIFT boats were available at US Navy Advisory Detachment (USNAD) at the beginning of the year. Four more PTFs were assigned during the year to make a total of ten. However, six PTFs and two SWIFTS were normally all that were available for operations at any one time. This was due to the necessity for overhaul or repair which resulted from the expanded tempo and scope of operations.

(17) An average of 143 Vietnamese military or civilian, and [redacted] personnel were operationally ready and in a constant state of training throughout the year.

(18) [redacted] were conducted during 1965. One man was killed in action, eighteen were wounded in action, and one PTF was lost.

e. Psychological:

3. (TS) Intelligence:

SOG intelligence operations expanded during the year as

-2-

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LIMDIS

(C) Plans:

With increased tempo of operations and the assignment of JUVET mission and other long range plans, the need for a section to perform long range and contingency planning became apparent. A plans section was authorized by Change #1 to the SCG TO on 7 August and staffed as personnel became available.

5. (S) Logistics:

a. SCG logistical functions maintained pace with constantly increased operations during 1955. While the major support effort was primarily routine in nature, considerable priority actions were required.

[REDACTED] LIMDIS  
and delays have been encountered because of lack of control over shipping.

c. Another major factor affecting logistics was the advent of the Shining Brass program. This program, implemented in an expeditious manner on relatively short notice, placed a serious load on the entire logistics capability.


Appendix I - 1955 SCG Historical Summary

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LIMDIS

12-1 (Non 12-5 Organization) to  
Section I (Administration) to  
12-5 XG Historical Summary

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES



\* Augmented by TDY/TDY INTT's as required

I-A-1

# INTERVIEW





1975-001

1. Commander, SOG

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

2-6-1

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2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

4. Administrative Officer

5. Chief, Intelligence Branch

a. Chief Collection Section

b. Chief Target Section


c. Chief Security Section


6. Chief Operations Branch

a. Chief MARCOS Section (34 A)

b. Chief Abu Opns/Section

c. Chief AIROPS Section





1.2.2

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APPENDIX N (Special Operations) to  
MACV 1965 Command History

This annex summarizes the activities of the Studies and Observations Group (SOG), 2d Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) during the calendar year of 1965. Details of these activities are described in the appendix to this annex.

1. (TS) General:

a. In general, during 1965 SOG continued and intensified its program of harassment, diversion, political pressure, capture of prisoners, physical destruction, propaganda, and acquisition of intelligence against North Vietnam.

[REDACTED]

2. (TS) Operations:

a. Airborne:

(1) Execution of small demolitions, disruption of lines of communication (LOC), and limited psychological warfare operations continued to be performed by indigenous personnel of varying ethnic origins. With the advent of US bombing of North Vietnam, the [REDACTED] and establishing contacts with the local population to broaden the intelligence base for possible future exploitation.

[REDACTED]

b. Cross-border (Shining Brass):

[REDACTED]

c. Air:

(1) Covert reinforcement and resupply of in-place teams were conducted by fixed wing C-123 aircraft during the year. A total of 22 successful missions were flown.

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## SECTION I - ADMINISTRATION

1. (U) Command: [REDACTED]  
assumed command of SOG on 6 June 1965, replacing  
Colonel [REDACTED] USMACV, the original commander.

### 2. (U) Organization:

a. On 1 January 1965 SOG began operating under the  
JID of 1 January 1965 with an authorized strength of 63 officers,  
2 warrant officers, 14 civilians and 67 enlisted men.

b. On 1 July 1965 SOG began operating under a new  
JID of 1 July 1965 as a result of the semi-annual review conducted  
by the SOG structure. This gave SOG an authorized strength of  
63 officers, 2 warrant officers, 14 civilians and 73 enlisted  
men.

c. On 7 August 1965 Change #1 to the 1 July 1965 JID  
was submitted and approved. The significant changes were addi-  
tion of an Executive Officer and an addition of the Plans Branch.  
This increased SOG authorized strength to 73 officers, 2 warrant  
officers, 14 civilians and 73 enlisted men.

d. On 29 September 1965 Change #2 to the 1 July 1965  
JID was submitted and approved. This change pertained to each  
section of the SOG; however, the most significant changes were:

(1) The addition of a special assistant for  
airborne operations (Grade E-8) to coordinate and supervise  
Shining Brass activities.

(2) The addition of a liaison officer (Grade E-5)  
to provide command liaison with the counterpart organization,  
Strategic Technical Service (STS) of the Army of Vietnam (ARVN).

(3) The upgrading and redesignation of the Chief  
clerk position to E-9, SMaj, and

(4) The addition of a civilian personnel officer  
(Grade W-2) to administer employment of local nationals,  
primarily in support of airborne operations, both 34A and  
Shining Brass.

e. On 15 October 1965 CINCPAC published a new JID.  
This changed SOG authorized strength to 86 officers, 2 warrant  
officers, 15 civilians and 114 enlisted men.

I - 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

f. SOG message 9523 DTG 292111Z Nov 64 approved establishing a combat support section with a strength of 11 officers and 2 enlisted men. One of the eight spaces was to be obtained by converting an existing TD space (B-24-11 line 03). The addition of the other four spaces resulted in an authorized strength of 88 officers, 3 warrant officers, 13 civilians and 204 enlisted men.

g. CG, MACV directed by message DTG 240102Z Nov 64 that a Marine Recon Section be established with a strength of one officer and 3 enlisted men. This further increased the SOG authorized strength to 89 officers, 3 warrant officers, [REDACTED] and 119 enlisted men.

h. The January and End 1965 Organizations are shown at Tabs A and B respectively.

3. (U) Personnel:

a. Tab C is a list of SOG key commanders and staff officers.

b. During CY 65 SOG suffered 1 KIA, 3 SGA, 2 MIA, battle deaths and 7 medical evacuees. See Tab D.

TABS:

- A - January 1965 Organization
- B - End 1965 Organization
- C - List of Key Officers
- D - List of Casualties

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SECTION II - OPERATIONS

1. (S) This section deals with operations under the following subheadings:

II A - Airborne

II B - Spying Brass

II C - Air Operations

II D - Maritime

II E - Psychological Warfare

2. (S) Although not exclusively devoted to Airborne training (34A), the Long Thanh Historical Summary has been included as Tab D to Section II A.

II - 1

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMDIS

SECTION XIA -- AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

1. (TS) PLANNING AND POLICY:

a. A general reorganization of gvt and operations in RVN eventuated from a series of newly proposed concepts and inter-theater conferences. This [redacted] [redacted] sized the RV/AROT [redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted] Mentioned below are the significant policy planning matters which occurred during CY 65.



(3) CINCPAC msg DTG 110236Z Jun, a retransmission of a DIA message, emphasized to SOG the inadequacy of the intelligence data base concerning the infiltration of personnel and material into RVN, and presented a requirement for increased roadwatch and aerial reconnaissance coverage, with the [redacted] SOG took the position on this requirement that the roadwatch and [redacted] in NVN were inseparable, constituting one collection effort with SOG having primary responsibility with [redacted] A detailed re-evaluation of the original AROTS concept was undertaken in

XIA-1

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LIMDIS



~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMDIS

view of possible improvements in infiltration techniques, bases and capability.

(4) MACSCG msg DTG [REDACTED] revised SOG's original EDOGS concept. It proposed that COMUS/Borderland operations be undertaken as a matter of priority in areas south of the [REDACTED] and that subsequent reinforcement of teams be made to enhance their viability and provide capabilities for an expanded intelligence collection effort. It further proposed that renewed EDOGS missions north of the 20th parallel be undertaken as an additional task by the same teams or teams scheduled for future infiltration. The scope of these operations is include surveillance over even major road from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] personnel [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] suggested by using aircraft when required.

[REDACTED]

#### c. Heliborne Infiltration Concepts:

(1) MACSCG msg DTG 070115Z Jun recommended that heliborne and/or overland infiltration be considered for team employment in selected areas in NVN.

(2) CINCPAC msg DTG 090335Z Jun stated that it had previously concurred to JCS with use of [REDACTED] helicopters against NVN providing aircraft and crews were sanitized. It requested at this time a detailed and coordinated plan for employment of teams against selected routes in NVN.

[REDACTED]

IIA-2

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LIMDIS

II A - 3 to II-A-D-4-3

(44 pages)

SECTION IIB SHINING BRASS (CROSS BORDER) OPERATIONS

1 (TS) Summary of Operations:

a. Background. Initial Cross-Border operations into Laos were entitled "LEAPING LENA" and were comprised of US 5th Special Forces and ARVN personnel. LEAPING LENA operations were conducted with parachute drops of indigenous personnel only in Laos. These operations proved to be unsuccessful for numerous reasons; the absence of US advisor personnel was one of the main defects. On 7 March 1965 COMUSMACV transferred the responsibility for Cross-Border (Laos) to SCG and the program was designated SHINING BRASS. SHINING BRASS operations were operations directed against VC bases and infiltration routes within Laos, designed to initiate a series of graduated pressures against selected targets and LOC by conducting air strikes and ground operations. During the Spring and Summer months of 1965 continuous planning and coordination was conducted in preparation for the upcoming combined US/VN Cross-Border operations. This preparation consisted of the finalization of the concept of operations and the continuation of an intensified training program for the US/VN reconnaissance teams. Phase I was authorized for execution on 29 September 1965.

b. Present Concept of Operations:

(1) Phase I operations west of the Dak Prou an and Dak To areas to a maximum depth of 20 km from the SVN/Laos border in two operational areas. Intelligence collection, locating and validating targets, and direction of airstrikes is accomplished by ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Initial introduction of teams into Laos is made by ground infiltration utilizing helicopters to move to an LZ near the border. Subsequent resupply and evacuation of teams or replacement and addition of specialist personnel by air is authorized.

(2) Phase II operations visualize the exploitation of targets by raiding forces and by ever expanding ground probes of appropriately sized forces.

(3) Phase III operations will consist of increased ground/air raid activity and the development of guerrilla forces.

c. Training Activities:

(1) Recon teams are formed, equipped, and receive initial training at Camp Long Thanh, located 30 miles east of Saigon. Advanced training is conducted at the Khan Duc Forward Operational Base (FOB) and teams execute in-country training missions from there prior to cross-border operations. The in-country missions are conducted in the same manner as cross-border operations.

(2) Exploitation forces are formed and equipped at Camp Long Thanh and subsequently airlifted to Khan Duc for basic, advanced, and basic unit training.

d. Reconnaissance team operations conducted from ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ at ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ and ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ during the remainder of calendar year 1965 are as outlined below:

(1) SEPTEMBER: Two in-country training missions were launched for the two-fold purpose of confirming suspected enemy targets while simultaneously providing advanced training prior to employment on cross-border operations.

(2) OCTOBER: One in-country training mission was conducted resulting in the successful direction of a friendly airstrike completely destroying 6 - 8 buildings within the target area. Recon team made contact with the enemy and suffered 1 KIA.

(3) NOVEMBER:

(a) A SHINING BRASS operation was conducted on 2 November 1965 to Target ALPHA-1 (YB 834937) resulting in the confirmation of enemy activities and installations.

(b) Two in-country training missions were conducted resulting in negative enemy contact; however, the teams were able to detect evidence that previous enemy activity had occurred within the target areas. A third training mission was aborted due to intensified enemy activity within the Landing Zone area.

(4) DECEMBER:

(a) On 6 December 1965 one SHINING BRASS recon team infiltrated to Target KILO-1 (YC 703034). Team

was attacked by enemy force of undetermined size and later were exfiltrated. Two friendly VN members are MIA from this action.

(b) SHINING BRASS recon team launched on 9 December 1965 to Target INDIA-1 (YC 666104). Team made enemy contact resulting in one friendly VN team member KIA and one US member lightly WIA.

(c) On 16 December 1965 SHINING BRASS operation conducted to Target CHARLIE-1 (YB 673344). Team confirmed that target was of importance to the enemy.

(5) On 19 December 1965 SHINING BRASS operation conducted in the area of Target HOTEL-1 (YB 693290). Negative enemy contact or observation. X

e. Operations/Airstrikes List:

See Tab A.

f. Proposed concept of modified Phase I operations submitted on 8 January 1966 to CINCPAC includes the following:

(1) Increasing the number of recon teams to 20 with 3 US members in each and reorienting recon teams to locate enemy weaknesses and suitable targets for raids and ambushes as well as air targets.

(2) Formation of 3 battalion sized ground or airmobile exploitation forces to be directed against weak points. Raids against installations, ambush of supply vehicles and carrying parties, and trail mining operations to add to enemy logistical burdens caused by airstrikes.

(3) Limit penetrations to present authorized 20 km, but extending area of operations to that of "TIGERHOUND" air operations making both operations mutually supporting.

(4) Conducting operations from 3 Forward Operational Bases located at Kontum, Kham Duc, and Khe Sanh.

2. (TS) Facility Improvement: Present facilities include a Command and Control Center at Danang operated by a modified SF C detachment and two Forward Operational

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Bases located at Kham Duc and Dak To operated by a modified SF B detachment. Planned expansion envisaged the FOB at Dak To being moved to Kontum where security and ease of operations will be enhanced, and the establishing of a third FOB, possibly at Khe Sanh, to be used for operations in the northern areas. All FOB's to be operated by modified SF B detachments.

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LIMDIS

TAB A (AIRSTRIKES) TO SECTION IIB (SHINING BRASS) TO 1965 SOG HISTORICAL SUMMARY  
SHINING BRASS OPERATIONS/AIRSTRIKES

RECON TEAM	TARGET	DATE INFIL	DATE EXFIL	DATE SORTIES	NUMBER	BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
IOWA	TANGO-3 YC729083	8 OCT 65	10 OCT 65	10 OCT 65	4	8 bldgs dest, 3 huts and numerous shes dest
IOWA	DELTA-1 YC598258	18 OCT 65	23 OCT 65	1 NOV 65	37	Numerous secd expl
ALASKA	ALFA-1	2 NOV 65	3 NOV 65	3 NOV 65	2	Not reported
				3 NOV 65	3	1 bridge dest, 6 bldgs dest, 2 bldgs dan, 2 secd expl
				4 NOV 65	12	Not reported
				5 NOV 65	53	30 struc dest, 18 struc dan, 2 caves dest, 4 emplacements dest, 8 secd expl
				10&11 NOV 65	18	Not reported
KANSAS	KILO-1	6 DEC 65	11/13 DEC 65		0	
IDAHO	INDIA-1	9 DEC 65	10 DEC 65		0	

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

IIB-A-1

SW17  
LIMDIS

RECON TEAM	TARGET	INTEL DATE	EXFIL DATE	SORTIES DATE	NUMBER	BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
PANOWA	CHARLIE-1	15 DEC 65	12 DEC 65	30 DEC 65	UNK	80% dest
	YB673344			31 DEC 65	10	100% dest
ALASKA	HOTEL-1	15 DEC 65	22 DEC 65	30 DEC 65	UNK	Bridge dest
	YB683290			31 DEC 65	10	1 struc dest
	ALBORA			30 DEC 65	UNK	6 struc dest, 1 large seed expl
	YB683326			31 DEC 65	6	1 struc dest



II-C-1 to II-C-3

(3 pages)

# Shining Brass

Missions are described in the Shining Brass operations portion of the history. Air operations supported the Shining Brass mission by operating six VNAF H-34 helicopters and 8 VNAF crews. A liaison officer was kept at the Command and Control Center, Danang Air Base, to supervise operation of the helicopters, their maintenance and crew scheduling. He also served as the primary contact for logistics airlift.

Additionally, his function is the primary office responsible for scheduling airstrikes against targets validated by Shining Brass reconnaissance teams.

(2) The helicopter is best suited to Shining Brass operations. SOG used VNAF H-34's during the period. Because of the shortage of crews and aircraft it has been difficult to obtain the needed resources. When they are procured it withdraws from the assets of the Corps areas. SOG is preparing a study to justify the assignment of a higher performance. It's longer range, greater payload capability and assignment under direct control of SOG would give the required capability to carry out the SOG mission.

(3) On 18 October 1965 the first Shining Brass mission was launched. One [redacted] with 3 VNAF aircrew members and one US Army Captain on board. Additionally, a [redacted] lost. Captain Wade Simpson, USMC, assigned to MACSOG, was in the O-1 which was flown by a USAF Major. The primary cause factor for both aircraft losses was bad weather in the Kham Duc and Danang area. Neither aircraft were located nor was any further information attainable on where they may have crashed.

(4) In addition to tactical airlift support by VNAF F-24's and logistics support by SAM C-123's the USARV provides forward air controller support using O-1's. Initially, two FAC's staged at forward operating bases (FOBs) at Thanh Duc, Lai To or Kontum, as appropriate. They remained at the FOB during the day when their base failed. Located and made the required radio contacts and called in airstrikes when needed. In December 1965 a new unit, named [REDACTED] and commanded by [REDACTED] was established to step up the support of forward operating bases. FAC's and aircraft are now assigned to the FOB and give direct support constantly to Shining Brass. An Airborne Command Post remains within communications range of the FAC's and obtains Directly approval for airstrikes in a fraction of the time previously required.

### C. Logistics Airlift

With initiation of Shining Brass operations airlift of supplies and passengers became "big business" for SOG. A construction project at Thanh Duc to build barracks, a mess and etc., was initiated. In addition, personnel had to be transported between the training and staging bases at Camp Long Thanh, Danang and the FOB's. At year end SOG was moving three times as much cargo per month as it had before Shining Brass operations commenced.

[REDACTED] were airlifted by SOG C-123's as compared to 38,000 pounds during September before Shining Brass operations started. To direct the management of this expanded airlift requirement a special SOG directive was published as MACSOG Directive 700-1, December 1965.

[REDACTED] Three VNAF crews were CONUS trained. One was never used because of its political instability; another was lost operationally; the third has been completely ineffective since May 1965 due to duty not involving flying (DHIT) of the copilot. Two VNAF crews are scheduled for CONUS training starting 12 January 1966.

[REDACTED] Negotiations are in progress to get a replacement copilot for VNAF crew V-2 and train him in-country.

IIC-5

PAGE 5 OF 11 PAGES

b. Crew position at year end was:

[REDACTED]

(2) One VNAP crew, non-robbed ready, with copilot DSIF indefinitely.

(3) Two VNAP crews are scheduled for training starting 15 January 1966 for 33 weeks.

[REDACTED]

d. Because of the critical shortage of aircrews, SOG requested CINCPAC, by message MACSCG 26977, 2 August 1965, to provide training input dates for additional VNAP aircrews. CINCPAC approved the request and passed action to CINCPACAF. At year end two VNAP crews were processed and ready for travel to the CONUS in January 1966. Negotiations were underway to obtain two more [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

13) F-105 Whiskey Alpha was engaged in the emergency evacuation of Nha Trang Air Base, Vietnam, to Saigon, based on intelligence that an attack by Viet Cong on Nha Trang Air Base was strongly suspected. Aircraft was on a 150 operational clearance. Crew established communications via radar contact with Saigon approach control and was vectored to final approach course for precision radar approach to runway 25. He was lost on the radar scope 13 miles out. Investigation revealed aircraft was hit by an estimated 20 to 30 rounds of 20mm ground to air fire. The aircraft caught fire in the right wing, entered a steep right spiralling turn and crashed. It contacted the ground in a 45-50 degree nose low attitude in a 20-25 degree right bank.

[REDACTED]

IIC-7

PAGE 7 OF 11 PAGES

1. The C-123 advisory support provided by the VNAF (Crew V-2) was [redacted] throughout the year. Accordingly, the Chief SOG sent a letter on 20 May 1965 to Maj General Rowland, Chief Air Force Advisory Group, asking his support in assigning crew V-2 full time to the 1st Flight Detachment at Nha Trang and physically locating them there. It was explained that SOG could no longer live with dual and split leadership of Major Cocng directing the VNAF crew from Saigon and the 1st Flight Detachment programming their tactical missions and training support. On 30 October 1965 a letter to Brig General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff, was sent by Chief of Staff, MACV. This letter re-emphasized the problems previously stated and asked that V-2 be in place at Nha Trang 5 days before and during the entire moon period. It was further stated that future crews trained must be permanently assigned to the 1st Flight Detachment, Nha Trang. General Vien replied that Headquarters, Vietnam Air Force, had been authorized direct coordination with SOG to organize a meeting designed to solve obstacles pointed out by SOG and requested that SOG be directed to contact Headquarters, Vietnam Air Force, to discuss problems. On 18 December 1965 the meeting was held. Principals were [redacted] Colonel Brannon, Air Force Advisory Group; Lt Colonel Ucc, Vietnam Air Force [redacted]. Many minor problem areas were discussed and the following tentative agreements were reached:

IIC-8

PAGE 8 OF 11 PAGES

(1) The VNAF 83rd Tactical Group would be activated soon and operations will be managed thru a special section of the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).

(2) The 83rd Tactical Group, SOG, and Project Delta will be represented by air liaison officers in the TACC.

(3) It was agreed by the VNAF that aircrews could be located with the aircraft, i.e., C-123 crews at Nha Trang.

(4) The 83rd Tactical Group will have its own aircraft maintenance.

(5) Personal equipment will be normal VNAF except for special items SOG requires.

(6) Supply support will be normal VNAF except for special items SOG requires.

(7) Supplemental pay for special duty was discussed. A standardized contract agreement was sought. Per diem and penetration pay was agreed upon, i.e., 500 Vietnam piastres per day per diem for 12 hours or more away from home station and 3000 Vietnam piastres for each border crossing into NVN. The VNAF also wanted a 30,000 Vietnam piastre recruitment bonus each 12 months with a 5000 Vietnam minimum per month. This was unacceptable to SOG and the Air Force Advisory Group. The two items were set aside by [REDACTED] to be taken up with General Ky and General Vien if he deemed appropriate.

j. The loss of two aircrews and aircraft placed a critical strain on SOG to carry out its logistical air-lift tasks. Accordingly, two 2nd Air Division USAF aircrews were placed on six months TDY to SOG starting about 1 October 1965. These aircrews were averaging near 100 hours per month flying through 31 December 1965. A change to the manning document was being staffed in MACV to increase authorizations to include these positions.

### 3. (TS) Aircraft Status:

[REDACTED]

IIC-8

PAGE 9 OF 11 PAGES

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1. The first part of the document is a letter from the [redacted] to the [redacted] dated [redacted]. The letter discusses the [redacted] and the [redacted] of the [redacted] and the [redacted] of the [redacted].

[illegible]

(1) The C-130 is the only one having growth potential to meet future payload requirements. Using the 463L aerial delivery system (AES) it can deliver three 12 foot platforms of 3500 lbs each as opposed to approximately one for the C-123.

(2) Its significant higher speed decreases appreciably the exposure time in hostile territory;

37C-10

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[REDACTED]

(4) The radar including terrain avoidance equipment gives it the advantage of a constant low level profile rather than merely a low altitude insertion capability. It can be operated in valleys out of line of sight with enemy early warning radar and dive control systems.

(5) It has a capacity for expansion of ECM equipment to cope with the expanded air defenses in the RVN. The C-123 has exhausted its development capability due to limited payload ability.

d. Notwithstanding the improved capabilities of C-123's, SSG considers the helicopter to be the only weapon system that can insert delivery of an impact operational team to a pre-selected point that can be fully operational almost immediately.

[REDACTED] Additional missions are planned for 1966. The [REDACTED] lacks the range and payload needed for extensive operations in Northern Laos or NVN. The CH-3B is considered an ideal weapon system for the present state of the art and a study was being prepared at the end of the year to justify assignment of these helicopters to SSG for 34A and Shining Brass operations.

e. Announcement had been made of the deployment of a [REDACTED] in early 1966. Of interest, however is the possibility that [REDACTED] might be made available to that unit. Originally, it was planned that [REDACTED] were to be part of its aircraft assets, but production is now being diverted to Vietnam. At the end of 1965 consideration was being given to requesting CINCPAC to task the Composite Air Commando Squadron to support 34A operations and to request that the unit be equipped with [REDACTED]



Summary of operations conducted, and results:

17D-1

## SECTION II D - MARITIME OPERATIONS

1. (TS) SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. The currently used code names for the various types of MAROPS mission conducted during CY 1965 will be used in this summary to facilitate brevity. These code names are defined as follows:

a. [REDACTED] - Separately scheduled Nasty Class PTF [REDACTED] SWIFT mission wherein NVN junks are [REDACTED] 1  
[REDACTED] junks are either destroyed or captured as tactical situation dictates.

b. [REDACTED] - Separately scheduled Nasty Class PTF and/or SWIFT mission interdiction mission wherein NVN vessels in patrol area are stopped, boarded and searched.



c. Summary of operations scheduled, accomplished and results:

*good copy of previous Pg II D-1*

II D-2 TO II D-12

(11 pages)

**f. General:**

(1) The continually increasing readiness posture of North Vietnamese coastal defense forces made maritime operations either ashore or in close proximity to shore increasingly difficult during the year. Timely intelligence, careful briefing of operational personnel and thorough planning alleviated this problem to some extent. Unacceptably high sea states resulting from unfavorable weather and limited boat availability due to maintenance requirements also hindered operations. Nevertheless, operations were vastly increased in tempo and scope.

IID-13

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[REDACTED]

10. Author's name: [redacted] Address: [redacted]

[illegible]

On 12 August 1965, [REDACTED] was assigned to duty as the Targeting Officer for WAREPS. His assignment expedited procurement of adequate intelligence for planning WAREPS missions and provided expert photo interpretation services on a prompt and continuing basis.

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II D-15  
(1 page)

[REDACTED]

(7) The floating drydock at USNAD, in spite of all possible preventive maintenance, deteriorated to the extent that it was necessary to send it to the Ship Repair Facility, Sasebo, Japan on 25 August. It was overhauled and returned to USNAD on 27 October.

(8) Planning/coordination/liaison conferences and visits between MAROPS and USNAD personnel occurred frequently throughout the year with a resultant increase in proficiency, unity of purpose and effort.

[REDACTED]

(9) Unsatisfactory characteristics of various items of boat [REDACTED] imposed operational limitations. Corrective action was initiated and close supervision maintained. A conference was held at CINCPAC HQ during December which was concerned with this problem area. The Chief, Operations and Chief, MAROPS from SOG, and the Assistant Training Officer, USNAD attended this conference which dealt with the following:

(a) Funding


(b) Need for specific details regarding equipment characteristics or purpose, to aid R&D of certain items.

(c) Determination of on-shelf procurement vice R&D.

(d) Priority based on operational need.

(10) Provision of adequate logistical support of USNAD continued to be a problem; supply sources, transportation, long distances and items peculiar to MAROPS all being contributory factors. SOG Logistics was cognizant of, and continually devoted its best efforts to solving these





(13) A pilot action program initiated at a destitute Thienmuang nationals in close proximity to USARV facilities was gratefully received. The success of this program was such that it was placed on a continuing basis.

infringement on NSAWD security areas created insurmountable problems, which were dealt with as they arose.

awarded the following citation:  
 army degree, to the Vietnamese personnel of the Coastal  
 Security Service at USNAD effective 24 September 1965;

- Destroying 51 military installations.
- Sinking two boats, 20 armed supply trucks.

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- Killing 40 of the boat, capturing 75 and another number of them.

- Capturing a big haul of weapons, military equipment and ammunition.

Displaying a formidable fighting spirit and a high sense of duty, the Coastal Security Service has effectively contributed to check the expansion of communism. This action is accompanied by a gallantry medal with a high rank.

## 2. (TS) TRAINING ACTIVITIES

a. The standards of aggressiveness, professional competency, initiative and judgement which U.S. Armed Forces personnel are accustomed to accepting as a matter of course were not always apparent in our Vietnamese counterparts in operational units. Constant efforts were made to minimize problems of this nature by example, appropriate advisory action and constant training.

(1) Boat Crew Training. Refresher training was accomplished whenever operational requirements and boat availability permitted. Particular emphasis was placed on Vietnamese crew boat maintenance and underway repairs. Individual and multiple boat tactics and gunnery were also stressed.

## 3. (S) HOUSING IMPROVEMENT

a. Officer and enlisted quarters and messing facilities were constructed at Camp Fay, and all hands moved from their quarters in Da Nang to their new housing. This move, which was completed on 24 August was highly desirable from both security and operational readiness viewpoints, since it removed sensitive USMACV personnel from the immediate proximity of Vietnamese civilians and the numerous unclassified American forces personnel, and also put

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them in housing only a few minutes ride from motor bus stations. Formerly, a lengthy trip across a bridge and along poorly maintained roads had to be made to get from quarters to duty station.

b. These small and isolated individual team training camps situated along China Beach from Ft. to the Marble Mountain were scheduled to be consolidated into a new facility constructed at Beach Rock Bay. This consolidation was highly desirable due to the build-up of American forces in the area, as well as affording an opportunity for closer supervision of Landing Teams. Quarters were completed with the exception of installation of messing and sanitary facilities, so the consolidation had to be delayed until this was accomplished. Estimated time of completion is sometime during early 1966.

c. Continued efforts were made to improve the security and comfort of existing facilities. Windows in the Command Post were closed with concrete blocks, better fencing was installed, trenches and weapons emplacements were dug in all required areas, and numerous other projects were completed.

IID-19


PAGE 19 OF 19 PAGES

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SECTION 1.1 - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. (IS) MISSION The mission of the Psychological Operations Group is to advise, assist and control psychological operations of Strategic Technical Force (STF) for the purpose of creating a climate of opinion in North Vietnam favorable to U.S. S.E. operations, supporting U.S. physical destruction operations, and exerting psychological pressure on the North Vietnamese to cease support of U.S. activity in the Republic of Vietnam."



IIE-1

PAGE 1 OF 11 PAGES

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II E-2 To II E-12  
11 pages

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### 3. OPERATIONS

a. Standard communication procedures were instituted on all SOG circuits and a SOG Communications Electronics Instruction was written to provide basic information and guidance. Standard Operating procedures were revised and re-issued.

SOG sampling of reports by Thailand was based on a regular reporting schedule to SOG HQ. The lack of direct circuitry to these locations. This problem was resolved by the filing sampling station with a SOG Liaison Office (SLO-135) for use on the telephone circuit. The Liaison Office at Saigon. Large number of reports were provided for use on telegraph circuit to get to SOG HQ information.

### 3. (S) RADIOS

a. A SOG SSB net was established with AN/FRC-92 (RTM-2A) radios between SOG HQ, Long Thanh, Nha Trang and

III-1

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Danang in February 1965. The net was extended to include C&C Detachment Danang upon its activation in support of Shining Brass operations 12 October 1965. The C&C Detachment Danang was also provided with an HF transmitter and HF receivers R-390A/URR to establish a radio station base for Shining Brass operations. This equipment was installed in the communications space of the C&C Detachment Danang. Forward Operations Base Kham Duc was added to the C&C net in November 1965 using RMR-2A equipment with RS-1 CW for back up. FCB Dak Ho was added to the net in December 1965 using RMR-2A equipment with RS-1 CW for back up.

b. In support of Shining Brass operations AM/PBC-64 radios were acquired and tested to verify for air-ground communications. This radio which AM/PBC-64 was obtained and tested as viable for air-ground communications. Since no crystals for the new equipment were available, development of this equipment which were on hand were cannibalized for their crystals. At the end of the year crystals for this equipment had not been received despite high priority requisitions and several follow-up messages. AM/PBC-64 was found to be more suitable than the RS-1 for Shining Brass operations.

c. RF-1 transceivers were obtained and issued to Shining Brass teams for air-ground communications.

d. NAD Danang reported their attempts to maintain the AM/ARC-94 (613T) equipments operating in the PTFs were meeting with little success due to lack of repair parts, instruction books and trained repair personnel for this aircraft equipment. A major factor in failures of this equipment is its apparent inability to withstand the pounding which it takes when the PTFs are underway. Suggestions for better shock mounting or possible replacement with Navy TCS transmitters were made.

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f. Conical monopole antennas installed at NAD  
Danang and Camp Long Thanh proved unsatisfactory.

g. A BC-610 transmitter was transferred from NAD  
Danang to First Night Detachment Nha Trang in June 1968  
for use in training and flight following

h. Since June FAS-210 was field tested and  
found to be reliable. Two more were received in November in  
the manufacturer in Bangkok for modification to increase  
range and operating capability. Throughout the year various  
radio equipment was received and/or tested for their  
applicability to SOG missions [REDACTED]

i. Throughout the year SOG communications was  
plagued with power failures of the generators in the W.C.  
2 compound. Although continuous liaison was maintained



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with USAS public works. Little relief was realized since new or replacement generators were not available. In December Chief JG notified JG of the problem which was becoming intolerable and requested MACV's assistance. Late in December, two new 60 KW generators were added to provide power for other than SOG users which had been drawing power from the generator providing power to SOG communications. However, this action still did not prevent a number of communications outages when the SOG generator failed or had to be secured for maintenance, since no reliable standby generator was available.

e. After one and one-half years of verbal agreements with various commands to provide maintenance support to SOG communication equipment, MACV JG was requested in November to task appropriate commands to provide this support. As a result of this request, U.S. Army Vietnam tasked specific commands to provide maintenance support to SOG radio, teletypewriter and crypto equipment located at SOG Headquarters, NAD DaNang, and First Flight Detachment, Nha Trang.

III-4

4 5

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III-5

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V

## SECTION V - PLANS

1. (S) MISSION The purpose of the Plans Branch is to prepare detailed long-range operational and outtings by plans for execution of future assigned or assigned tasks. In addition to initial preparation of plans, this branch is tasked with the responsibilities for updating, revising and re-writing existing plans pertaining to on-going projects.

2. (S) MANNING. Change No. 1 to HANNOG JTD, dated August 1965, authorized the following personnel for the Plans Branch:

TITLE	CODE	GRADE	NUMBER
Chief	32162	05	1
Plans Officer	9087	04	2
Plans Officer	32162	04	1
Plans Officer	6316	04	1
Operations Sgt.	11F4S	07	1
Clerk Typist	7LB2A	24	1

Prior to the approval of JTD Change No. 1, planning functions had been performed on an additional duty basis by personnel of the various Branches/Sections. One officer was assigned to the plans section for a three month period (August - October) another for two months (October - November) and the Operations Sgt. reported for full time duty in August. The Chief and two Plans Officers reported in December and the remaining officer is expected in January 1966. The Clerk Typist position is the only space not filled or forecast.

3. (S) ACCOMPLISHMENTS. Initial activity centered on organization, requisitioning and procuring needed supplies, furniture, equipment, documents, publications, studies, etc. All required higher headquarters plans and annexes are on hand and necessary supporting plans are being prepared. Of primary interest is the publication of a COMUSMACVASIA Plan and the supporting JTD.

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[illegible]

[REDACTED]

(b) The remaining information was obtained from a message from Winston, dated 1000, 10/1/50, and contained the intelligence followed by the above.

(1) Four DPs were sent to GIP #1 and 2. The Division containing target intelligence is in the target area.

(3) In addition, 500 recommended three in 20 strikes for B-52 strikes. These targets were eventually approved.

14-2

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

3. (15) Shining Brass Support. Preparations for this operation began in August 1960. On September 10, intelligence files for the operation were published. The photographic analysis which served as basis of this work was of such significance that it was presented as a briefing on 16 September. Plans for the intelligence support for Shining Brass developed in two dimensions - preparation of team targets and preparation of target intelligence within the Shining Brass area of operation.

a. Shining Brass Targets.

(1) [REDACTED] prepared the target operations.

(2) The significant action against targets was presented in message form (Shining Brass Target Operations) and contained the intelligence collected by the teams.

b. Target Intelligence.

(1) Four B-52s were sent to HST and the Air Division containing target intelligence in the target area.

(2) From this mission, the B-52s were validated for the HST target area.

(3) In addition, the recommended areas in the areas for B-52 missions, which were approved, were approved.

4. (3) [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

5. (U) Photo Interpretation Equipment. The expansion of photo interpretation requirements created a serious shortage of equipment, primarily light tables. SCG had, up to this point, operated with two (2) light tables. Five (5) additional tables had been ordered in June 1966 but, due to shipping and warehouse problems, none were received until November (3 received). The other two were received in December. There was a shortage of photo interpretation personnel during the first half of the reporting period. Since June, the gradual increase of trained interpreters gave SCG an adequate photographic interpretation capability to support current operations.

## SECTION VI - LOGISTICS

### 1. (U) FACILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION

a. Construction projects throughout the GRC were planned and scheduled at various times. Major projects were completed during the year mentioned:

(1) Jackson Hall - SOG for 1st Flight, 1st Group, Nha Trang.

(2) Camp Tay - Consolidation of administrative, education and living facilities for Naval Advisory Detachment, Da Nang.

(3) Miscellaneous barracks and administrative facilities at Camp Long Thanh.

b. Additional construction to consolidate the beach camps in Da Nang East was accomplished to provide Camp Black Rock. This project was under the auspices of the 1st and the 3rd MAF to make way for the Marine Air Group in Da Nang East. The basic camp was completed on 1 October. In as much as provisions were not made for utilities, no camp has not been completed. Additional projects were established to obtain utilities, the US Navy providing labor, SOG the materials.

c. SOG property rentals were reduced by approximately 75% during the year due primarily to completion of Da Nang and Nha Trang consolidated facilities as well as the building in Saigon. While the number of individual leases under lease was reduced, rentals were an increase on each lease renewal. Rental increases averaged approximately 35% per individual lease.



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f. Shining Brass construction at Kham Duc was accomplished to provide facilities for the operation.

g. The relocation of Shining Brass Command and Control Center Danning to Camp Fay, Danning last was in progress. The new facilities include an administrative building as well as additions to existing IAC EO's and B. Co. Completion is estimated April - May 1966, dependent on materials availability.

h. Projects under way during the year, but not completed include:

- (1) Additional facilities at Camp Long Thanh.
- (2) Replacement of electrical generators at Camp Fay.
- (3) Rehabilitation at Nha Trang.

## 2. (S) PERSONNEL

a. The logistics portion of the Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) was increased to provide for new requirements as well as greater depth in the numbers and types of personnel. Notable was the addition of an Accountant, Motor Vehicle Supervisor, and additional supply specialists. Manning action for October 1965 changes was begun in December. Additional action was under way by the close of 1965 to provide additional personnel authorizations. These include:

VI-2

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

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- (1) Comptroller Section
- (2) Civil Engineer/Public Works Officer
- (3) Assistant Supply Officer
- (4) Transportation Section

c. In addition, logistics and administrative support of the actual operations, including detachments, was provided by non-US hire personnel, primarily British. These persons were authorized for FY 1966 for USARV G-1 and G-2 positions required for Shining Brass. These people provided a variety of support to include electrical services, supply operations, vehicle operations, construction, medical delivery, parachute repacking. The bulk of Vietnam personnel were recruited in performance of essential tasks and were providing well trained technicians.

3. (TS) BUDGET AND FISCAL

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V1 - 4

h. Resupply activities supported airborne and Psy War requirements. Bundles and supplies met flight schedules in an ever increasing tempo. New procedures and techniques were developed and employed during the year. Vietnamese (POBs) were trained in their specialties.

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R-04

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
APO San Francisco 96222

MACSOG

5 May 1967

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Annex M, 1966 MACV Command History (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Inclosed is Annex M (Special Operations) to the 1966 Command History.
2. (U) Because of the sensitive nature of the information contained in this annex, its distribution has been limited to those agencies considered to have an essential need-to-know. It is requested that no further distribution be made without the express consent of this headquarters.
3. (U) Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

*E. W. Gannon*  
E. W. GANNON  
Major, USA  
Asst AG

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- 2 - CSAF
- 5 - CINCPAC
- 1 - J5
- 1 - SJS History Br.
- 1 - SOG file

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
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ANNEX M (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) -TO MACV 1966 COMMAND HISTORY

1. (TSLD) GENERAL

a. This annex summarizes the activities of the Studies and Observations Group (SOG), Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), during the Calendar Year 1966. Details of these activities are contained in the appendices to this annex.

b. During CY66 SOG continued, expanded, and intensified its programs of harassment, diversion, political pressure, capture of prisoners, physical destruction, propaganda and acquisition of intelligence against North Vietnam; and combat operations including interdiction of supply routes, destruction of supplies and equipment, acquisition of intelligence information and post air strike damage assessment and exploitation against the enemy in selected portions of Laos.

c. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) mission was assigned to SOG during the year. Personnel for the JPRC began arriving in August, and on 17 September the JPRC was formally activated.

2. (C) ADMINISTRATION (APPENDIX I).

Authorized strength of SOG increased from 222 on 1 January to 275 on 31 December 1966.

3. (TSLD) INTELLIGENCE (APPENDIX II)

a. The Intelligence Branch was reorganized and streamlined during the year to provide for more efficient operation.

b. In August, an ADP system was initiated, which provided more rapid retrieval and collation of basic intelligence data.

c. Close liaison with other intelligence agencies was developed or improved during the year to provide for more complete intelligence coverage for targeting.

4. (TSLD) OPERATIONS, OPLAN 34A (APPENDIX III)

a. Maritime Operations.

(1) Covert boat and landing team operations continued to



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(2) Nine Nasty Class PTFs and three SWIFT boats were in the inventory at the beginning of the year. Three new Nasty Class PTFs were acquired during the year. At the end of the year seven Nasty Class PTFs and three SWIFT boats remained in the inventory. On the average, seven Nasty Class PTFs and three SWIFTS were operationally ready throughout the year, the remainder being down for overhaul or repair.

(3) An average of 11 PTF crews were operationally ready throughout the year. Three SWIFT crews were continually operational. Action team strength at the beginning of the year was 134, organized in five teams. At the end of the year, this strength had decreased to 104, organized in four teams.

(4) [REDACTED]

Eight men were killed in action, 15 were wounded in action, six were missing in action, and five PTFs were lost.

b. Air Operations.

[REDACTED]

(2) Air operations support of SHINING BRASS consisted of VNAF H-34 and 17 aircraft with VNAF crews, supplemented with US Army UH-1 helicopters and crews. Logistics support was provided initially by SOG C-123 aircraft, with C-130 aircraft added in October. USAF provided FAC support using C-1 aircraft.

(3) Air Operations Logistics Section fraged 442 missions in support of SOG activities. A total of [REDACTED] passengers were airlifted, a considerable increase over CY65. SOG C-123 and C-130E aircraft were used. [REDACTED]

c. Psychological Operations.

(1) Psychological operations continued with the same type of operations as in CY 1965. [REDACTED]

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d. Airborne Operations.

(1) The Airborne Operations Section, in conjunction with Strategic Technical Service (STS) counterpart personnel, continued to recruit, train, equip, and infiltrate agent teams into NVN, and subsequently to resupply and reinforce these teams. The team missions were to collect intelligence, [REDACTED] psychological operations, and render assistance to downed aircrews.

[REDACTED]

5. (TSLD) OPERATIONS, SHINING BRASS (APPENDIX IV)

a. SHINING BRASS operations are conducted against VC Bases and LOCs within certain specified areas in Laos. SHINING BRASS Phase I operations were initiated in October 1965. Reconnaissance (Spike Team) operations were conducted initially at a rate of three to four per month in 1965 and reached an average of 11 per month in 1966. Phase II operations were authorized on 20 June 1966 and were conducted thereafter at a frequency of about two per month.

b. Authorized strength at the end of CY66 was three exploitation battalions and 20 Spike Teams.

c. SHINING BRASS forces also support the Joint Personnel Recovery Center by conducting operations to recover US prisoners or evadees, both in and out of country.

6. (TSLD) JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (APPENDIX V)

a. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) was activated on 17 September 1966. Its mission is to provide a capability within USMACV for personnel recovery operations subsequent to termination of search and rescue (SAR) efforts.

b. Since its activation the JPRC has served as a focal point for all intelligence information relating to detained or missing personnel in the Southeast Asia Theater of Operations.

c. To complement the Safe-Area program in North Vietnam, the JPRC was directed to establish Safe Area Activation Teams (SAAT). At the end of CY66, six SAAT teams were operationally ready, and four additional teams recruited and ready for training.

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7. (TS) LOGISTICS (APPENDIX VI)

a. Logistics activities during the year kept pace with expanding operational requirements of SOG. [REDACTED]

b. Operational methods were also adjusted to new situations and requirements. Shipping procedures were revised to take advantage of in-country stocks and to save time and costs. [REDACTED]

c. Construction and rehabilitation, as well as procurement and disposition of rental property kept pace with expanding operations, in spite of some problems with the procurement of real estate.

8. (TS) PLANS (APPENDIX VII)

The Plans Section, authorized in 1965, continued to provide current, long-range, and contingency planning for SOG and JUWTF operations, as well as providing input to the plans of higher headquarters.

9. (SLD) COMMUNICATIONS (APPENDIX VIII)

The Communications Division kept pace with the increased requirements of SOG through the acquisition of additional and more efficient equipment, more effective routing of traffic, improved signal plans, and training of operators.

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APPENDIX I - ADMINISTRATION

1. (U) Command: Colonel John K. Singlaub, 037040, USA assumed command effective 14 May 1966, succeeding Colonel Donald D. Blackburn, 033734.

2. (C) Organization:

a. On 1 January 1966 SOG was operating under the JTD of 15 October 1965 at an authorized strength of [REDACTED] 88 officers, 3 warrant officers, 116 enlisted and [REDACTED]

b. During the year, a number of changes and additions, including the establishment of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, were made to the JTD. The year-end authorized strength was [REDACTED] 108 officers, 3 warrant officers, 149 enlisted [REDACTED]


c. The 1 January and 31 December 1966 organizations are shown at Tabs I-A and I-B respectively.

3. (U) Personnel:

a. Tab I-C is a list of SOG key commanders and staff officers.


b. Three SOG personnel were medically evacuated during CY 66.  
(See Tab I-D).

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\* Augmented by TDY/TDY MTTs as required

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\* Augmented by TDY/TDY MTIs as required

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TAB I-C KEY OFFICERS, 1966

POSITION

DATES

INCUMBENT

1. Commander, SOG

b. Spec Asst Abn Opn

c. Executive Officer

2. Administrative Officer

3. Chief, Intelligence Branch

4. Chief Operations Branch

a. Chief MAROP Sec (34A)

b. Chief Abn Opn Sec (34A)

c. Chief Air Opn Sec

d. Chief Medical Sec

e. Chief Abn Opns Sec (SB)

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TAB I-C KEY OFFICERS, 1966 (CONT'D)

POSITION

DATES

INCUMBENT

Page 11 of 119 pages

5. Chief Logistics Branch
6. Chief Comm Branch
7. CO MAROP Gp
8. Senior Adv Long Thanh Det
9. Chief PSYOP Gp
10. CO AIROP Gp
11. Chief Plans Branch
12. Chief Comptroller Branch
13. Chief JPRC



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TAB I-D MEDICAL EVACUEES FOR CY 1966

NAME

RANK

CW2

SSG

SSG

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APPENDIX II - INTELLIGENCE

1. (TSLD) The following improvements were made during the 3rd and 4th quarters of calendar year 1966 to provide a more qualitative intelligence product in support of MACSOG operational responsibilities:

a. Operational Reorganization of Branch: (TAB II-A)

(1) The Collection and Plans and Estimates Sections were combined into the Operations Section, using existing TD positions and establishing Country Desks. This consolidation significantly reduced the response time to requests for the support of SOG operations.

(2) The Targeting Section was consolidated by placing all photo interpreters in one location, and was redesignated the Photo Analysis Section. Response time again was reduced significantly on all requirements. A clerk was added in July to maintain a film library and map coverage of the areas of interest.

(3) An Administrative Section was established. Using existing TD positions, the Intelligence Officer became the assistant to the Branch Chief. This position provided an officer familiar with intelligence to assign tasks and to coordinate the efforts of the Branch. Administrative matters and projects also are handled by this section. This provides better utilization of the other Sections, and frees the Branch Chief from routine administrative tasks.

b. Maritime Operations:

(1) In October, an Intelligence Officer with a Vietnamese language capability was assigned to Camp DODO to supervise exploitation and collection efforts.

(2) An SOP for reporting intelligence obtained from interrogation of MAROPS detainees was prepared and implemented in October.

(3) An Interrogation Guide incorporating EEI and OIR was prepared and put into use in July.

(4) The technique for targeting CADO missions was improved by drawing on the resources of the Targeting and Operations Sections.

c. Airborne Operations: Comprehensive Road Watch reporting format and EEI were prepared and furnished [REDACTED]

d. SHINING BRASS Operations:

(1) An intelligence report to supplement the SB after-action report was established 1 July.

(2) Beginning in November, the method of targeting for SB missions was improved by using photo interpretation and all available intelligence obtained by the Operations Section.

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(3) The results of all SB missions are plotted in an attempt to pinpoint VNA/VC Base areas and activities, employing Base Area Study techniques developed by CICV. This program, begun in October, has been the basis of much valuable intelligence to support targeting of SB missions. A great deal of worthwhile intelligence also was provided to MACV J2 as a result of this program.

e. An ADP system was initiated in August to provide rapid retrieval and collation of basic intelligence data.

2. (TSLD) SHINING BRASS Intelligence Activities:

a. Supplemental Intelligence Reports.

(1) Sixty-five supplemental intelligence reports were submitted by the Intelligence Branch during the period 1 July - 31 December. This program was initiated on 1 July.

(2) These supplemental reports contained the following type information:

(a) Activities of enemy and indigenous personnel.

(b) Location and descriptions of installations, fortifications, and structures.

(c) Terrain information to include trails, roads, fords, ferries, obstacles, etc.

(d) Crops and livestock.

(e) Results of friendly airstrikes.

(f) Results of US/SVN Psyop programs.

b. Spot Reports - Prior to 1 July two Spot Reports were submitted to JCS on SHINING BRASS missions. These were special reports and were not a part of the normal reporting procedure.

c. Studies, Estimates, and Annexes Prepared:

(1) Intelligence Estimate No. 1 for support of cross border operations in the DMZ. - September 1966.

(2) Intelligence Estimate No. 2 for support of OPLAN 37B-66, Phase III, SHINING BRASS. December 1966.

(3) Intelligence Annex for OPLAN 37B-66, Phase III, SHINING BRASS. December 1966.

(4) Area Analysis for Cambodian cross border operations. December 1966.

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(5) SHINING BRASS area mission analysis:

- (a) HASTINGS Operations. August 1966.
- (b) Khe Sanh Salient. August 1966.
- (c) PRAIRIE Operations. October 1966.
- (d) Ashau Salient. December 1966.

d. Target Selection and Development:

- (1) A total of 133 targets were selected and developed.
- (2) A total of eight roadwatch sites were recommended by MACV J2 and were developed by the Intelligence Branch.
- (3) A total of eight targets were recommended by 3rd MAF in support of Operation HASTINGS in the temporary extension of the SHINING BRASS area. The eight targets were developed in July.
- (4) During September 16 targets were recommended by III MAF and developed in support of Operation PRAIRIE. The targets were located in western Quang Tri Province and in Laos adjacent to the border.
- (5) A total of 28 targets were recommended for ARC LIGHT struck by the Intelligence Branch.

e. Expansion of Area Coverage: During June, six targets were developed in the northern SHINING BRASS area within the Khe Sanh Sector.

f. Changes Necessitated by Expansion of Operational Area:

- (1) During June, close liaison was established between the Intelligence Branch and MACV J2, CIGV, and CIIB to provide more complete intelligence for targeting.
- (2) The increase in target requests required that joint procedures be established between the Targeting and Operations Sections. Operations Section collected and collated intelligence on possible targets and furnished the information to Targeting Section. The Targeting Section, using this information, did photo readouts and prepared the target folders.

3. (TSLD) MAROPS Intelligence Activities:

a. Spot Reports:

(2) The majority of these spot reports provided information on military order of battle and coastal defense installations of NVN. Other

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subjects reported on were:

- (a) Para-military activities.
- (b) Air defense.
- (c) Conscription.
- (d) Coastal sea transportation.
- (e) Population controls.
- (f) Identification of dissident groups.
- (g) US/RVN airstrike results.
- (h) Effects of war on NVN economy.
- (i) Collectivization program in NVN.
- (j) Governmental and popular reaction to friendly  
paywar operations.

(3) Special interest reports were submitted on:

- (a) NVN policy regarding actions and conduct of NVN  
fishermen towards US pilots downed at sea.
- (b) The downing and disposition of US aircraft and pilots.

(d) NVN defensive measures against MAROPS operations.

b. Intelligence Information Reports:

(2) These reports primarily provided information on military  
and defense activities along the NVN coast. Other subjects reported on were:--

(a) Political, economic, and social activities in the  
villages and hamlets of the NVN coastal region.

(b) Beach and hydrographic information.

c. Studies, Estimates, and Annexes prepared:

(1) Intelligence Annex to OPLAN 11-66 SHOT GUN. May 1966.

(2) NVN coastal defense study of all known gun positions

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occupied and unoccupied, between 17°-30'N in October 1966.

(3) Intelligence Annex to OPLAN 37D-66 for Cambodian MAROPS. November 1966.

(4) Intelligence Annex to OPLAN FREEDOM SHIP. December 1966.

d. Target Development: A total of 98 targets were developed for MAROPS.

e. Problem Areas Encountered:

(1) Timely receipt of pre-strike aerial photography.

(a) Low priority assigned to Photo requests.

(b) Delivery system used to transport mission film from the Navy.

(2) Selection of targets based on an overall priority basis.

(3) Actions taken to remedy problems:

(a) CINCPAC was requested to assign priority I to pre-strike photography. This priority was assigned as of October.

(b) During August a coordinated procedure was established to expedite transportation and delivery of pre-strike photography.

f. Special Coastal Study: A comparative study of coastal defenses in NVN was made using MAY-JUN and OCT-NOV photography.

(1) The study was limited to the area that had usable comparative photo coverage available.

(2) Results of the study showed an overall increase in the area covered in the following:

(a) Trenching—23.14 NM

(b) Coastal defense gun positions—33

(c) AA/AW weapons positions—139

(d) Security posts—15

(e) Bunkers—11

4. (TSLD) ARNOPS Intelligence Activities:

a. Spot Reports:

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(2) The majority of these spot reports provided road watch type information and general area observations. Other subjects reported on were:

(a) GNVN activities in the Meo Tribal areas and Meo responses to these activities.

(b) Local security procedures.

(c) Evacuation of urban areas.

(d) Shipping in Haiphong, Hon Gay, and Cam Pha.

(e) Results of friendly airstrikes.

(f) Treatment of downed US pilots.

(g) Anti-US propaganda.

(h) General economic and political information.

(i) Construction activities.


b. Intelligence Information Reports: One intelligence information report was submitted on the Meo response to GNVN efforts to win Meo support.

c. Studies, Estimates, and Annexes prepared:

(1) General area studies were prepared for the areas of operations of Teams Hector, Samson, Hadley and Kern.

(2) Target analysis of the Lao Cai area was made.

(3) A revised general ERI was prepared for OP 34.



6. (TSLD) DANIEL BOONE; Intelligence Activities:

a. The Intelligence Branch selected 21 targets within Cambodia as

possible targets for DANIEL BOONE operations when approved by higher headquarters.

b. Photo interpretation of Cambodia was limited by the type of photography available. During 1966, high-altitude photography was the only type available.

7. (TSLD) Air/Anti-Air Intelligence Activities:

a. The air/anti-air element of the Operations Section maintained all AAA, Air, SAM, radar, and EOB for Laos, NVN and SVN. A graphic display of these holdings in addition to OB files were maintained.

b. Support was provided to 1st Flt Det, AENOPS, JPRC, MAROPS, and SHINING BRASS through the timely location and identification of enemy air and anti-air defenses in the areas of operations.

8. (C) Security Activities: The following is a listing of major activities in addition to the routine investigations and inspections conducted by the Security Section:

a. Prepared the SOG Security Directive 380-5.

b. Established briefing procedures for non-SOG personnel and personnel assigned and attached to SOG.

c. Initiated civilian and military (VN) card and personality files, and procedures for security checks on these personnel at the AM Embassy, OSA, and VN National Police.

d. Established continuing Liaison with STS. During 1966 the Security Section assisted STS in establishing security regulations and a Security Section.

e. Provided technical assistance to SOG with:

(1) DASE inspections and electronic sweeps. (Acquired F-100 Kit, recorder during 1966.)

(2) DAME service and support.

(3) Photographic service for SOG passes and other official documents.

f. Prepared the following documents:

(1) Evacuation/Fire Plan, January 1966.

(2) MACSOG D'r 606-1, SOG pass system, 5 April 1966.


(3) Passive Defense Plan, June 1966.

(4) Security Section SOP, November 1966.

(5) MACSOG D: 380-7, Military Security-Access to SOG Information, draft prepared December 1966.



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TAB II-A OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION as of September 1966

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**APPENDIX III - OPERATIONS**

(TSLD) Appendix III contains the historical summaries of the operational aspects of OPLAN 34A. These are presented in four sections:

Section 1 - Maritime Operations

Section 2 - Air Operations

Section 3 - Psychological Operations

Section 4 - Airborne Operations

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SECTION 1 - MARITIME OPERATIONS

1. (TS) SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. The current means of identifying types of MAROPS missions is by number, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The current mission designation method was adopted midway through CY 66. However, the code names are used throughout this report to simplify identification. These code names are defined as follows:

(2) a. [REDACTED] - Separately scheduled Nasty Class PTF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Junks are either destroyed or captured as tactical situation dictates.

b. [REDACTED] - Separately scheduled Nasty Class PTF [REDACTED] mission wherein NVN vessels encountered in the patrol area are stopped, boarded, and searched, [REDACTED]

If cargo of military nature is found, vessel is destroyed.

(1)

(C) The NASTY class PTF is an 80-foot, 80-ton diesel-powered [REDACTED] full boat capable of speeds up to 40 knots. Normal armament consists of one 40-mm gun, two 20-mm guns, one .50 cal MG and 81 mm mortar. Radar and communications equipment are provided.

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DATE

OPERATION

RESULTS

TOTALS  
CY 1966

126 Primary mns  
56 Secondary mns

353 prisoners captured.  
352 prisoners returned.  
86 enemy craft destroyed.  
16 enemy craft damaged.  
2,000,000 PSYHAR leaflets  
distributed by 81mm mortar.  
60,000 PSYHAR gift kits.  
delivered.  
2,600 PSYHAR radios  
delivered.

f. General:

(1) No MAROPS were conducted in 1966 until 17 February, at which time a 55-day JCS-ordered standown was terminated.

[REDACTED] Coastal guns engaged MAROPS craft frequently and as PTF assets decreased through operational attrition, missions were scheduled with a definite view toward conserving PTF assets on hand. Nevertheless, missions were executed along the entire NVN coast and over one-half of the total MAROPS missions conducted in 1966 were executed north of 19-00N.

(3) [REDACTED] relieved [REDACTED] as the Chief, MAROPS on 24 April. [REDACTED] relieved [REDACTED] as Operations Officer, MAROPS on 6 June. Lieutenant Colonel Butler relieved [REDACTED] as Plans Officer, MAROPS on 6 July. [REDACTED] relieved [REDACTED] as Assistant Operations Officer, MAROPS on 4 August. [REDACTED] relieved Lieutenant Commander [REDACTED] as Operations Officer, MAROPS on 20 November.

(4) Commander [REDACTED] relieved [REDACTED] as Officer in Charge, USNAD on 1 May.

(5) On 31 July the Chief, Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, approved the TO&E for the naval element of the Coastal Security Service. Approved strength was set at 362 Vietnamese Naval personnel. An average of 11 PTF crews composed of Vietnamese Naval personnel were operationally ready throughout the year.

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(7) PTF [REDACTED] operational status varied due to material casualties and operational losses. Three new Nasty Class PTFs were acquired in 1966. All three of these boats were subsequently lost during the year. The inventory at the beginning of the year consisted of nine Nasty Class PTFs [REDACTED]. At the end of 1966 seven Nasty Class PTFs [REDACTED] were in the SOG inventory.

An average of seven Nasty Class PTFs [REDACTED] were operationally ready throughout the year. At the end of 1966 the status of replacement PTFs was reflected in a JCS message which stated that the Trumpy Boat Yard, Annapolis, Maryland, had been awarded a contract to build six Nasty Class PTFs with first delivery in 18 months.

## 2. (TS) Operations:

a. The most effective operations conducted by MAROPS in pursuance of OPLAN 34A were PTF maritime interdiction missions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Maritime action team missions during the year did not succeed in attaining the degree of success anticipated. Several factors contributed to the relatively poor results achieved in action team missions. Adverse weather caused cancellation of missions which could not be rescheduled until the suitable moon phase in the following month; instances of mutual interference were experienced; [REDACTED] primarily pre-strike photography necessitated several action team cancellations; and, finally, an [REDACTED], coupled with [REDACTED] resulted in other missions being aborted.

b. The operational areas available to the MAROPS craft became [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] USN NGF/interdiction operation employing USN destroyers to engage military cargo vessels and active military coastal installations. By the end of 1966 SEA DRAGON had extended [REDACTED] 12 CON. Additional [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] restricting MAROPS craft to areas south of 19-30N so as not to expose PTFs to known operating areas of NVN air. PTFs had been attacked in northern waters by enemy air in 1966 without possessing adequate air defense weapons. [REDACTED] ?

## 3. (TS) Training:

a. Action Team Training. The major training advancement implemented in 1966 was the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These operations began in September and introduced across-the-beach missions similar in all respects to action team missions in NVN with certain exceptions. SOTROPS were conducted in SVN against known VC-occupied areas. The action teams were accompanied by US advisors who observed the conduct of the teams throughout the mission. Each SOTROPS [REDACTED]

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was scheduled and executed as a final rehearsal for a future mission in NVN and as nearly as possible involved elements and techniques which the teams would experience in operations in NVN. In addition to the value of SOTROPS in regard to action team training, intelligence information of value to the III MAF in the I Corps was furnished to G-2, III MAF.

b. Boat Crew Training. Cyclic and refresher training continued whenever boat availability and operational requirements permitted. Individual and multiple boat tactics as well as gunnery and fire discipline were stressed. Proper communication procedures were emphasized constantly as was the proper use of recognition procedures. The Mobile Support Team began a program of training all Vietnamese engineering ratings in maintenance and repair of the Napier Deltic engines, the propulsion system of the Nasty PTF.

4. (TS) Equipment:

5. (TS) Facilities:

a. The operational base for MAROPS craft at USNAD Danang became [REDACTED] because of the increased waterborne traffic and attendant personnel in the immediate area.

b. In the summer of 1966 the action team base camp construction at Black Rock was completed. Action teams were relocated at


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this camp from their individual camps in the vicinity of My Khe. These camps were turned over to the Danang Real Estate Directorate for other than SOG use. US SEAL advisors continued to be based at My Khe with their move to Black Rock scheduled in CY-67. In the fall of 1966 an explosion of unknown origin extensively damaged the My Khe camp. Repairs were effected; however, no rebuilding of facilities was undertaken since all activities will be transferred to Black Rock during first of CY-67.



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SECTION 2 - AIR OPERATIONS

1. (TSLD) MISSION. The primary mission of Air Operations is to provide responsive air support for SOG operations in Southeast Asia, with a secondary mission of furnishing adequate logistics airlift for SOG activities.

2. (TSLD) GENERAL. During CY 66 various types of aircraft were used to support the programmed operation for the year. The following history for Air Operations is outlined in three distinct air support areas: OPLAN 34A (operations in NVN), SHINING BRASS (counterinsurgency Laos/SVN border area) and logistics support for SOG activities. A chronology of the significant Air Operations events of CY66 is shown at Tab III-2-a.

3. (TSLD) OPLAN 34A AIR OPERATIONS: Air operations in support of OPLAN 34A during CY 66 were composed of two types of missions:

a. The greatest limiting factor during this period was weather. Thirty-nine percent of the flights scheduled were cancelled or aborted for this reason.

b. The charts at TABS III-2-B and C provide mission data by type of aircraft employed in support of OPLAN 34A during the period.

4. (TSLD) SHINING BRASS Air Support.

a. Air Operations supported the SHINING BRASS mission employing six to ten VNAF H-34 helicopters with eight VNAF Crews, and two VNAF U-17 aircraft with two VNAF U-17 crews. This was supplemented with four to ten US Army UH-1 helicopters and crews. Logistics support was initially provided by SOG C-123's. Beginning 20 October, C-130 aircraft were added. USAF provided FAC (Forward Air Controller) support using O-1 aircraft. USAF fighter aircraft were used as air cover during infiltrations and exfiltrations.

b. SHINING BRASS operations were tripled during CY 66, which tripled air support requirements. VNAF H-34 resources used by SHINING BRASS increased from six to a maximum of ten aircraft. All other aircraft support increased proportionally. During a typical operational period (18 July through 26 September) US Army UH-1B gunships flew 83 sorties in support of SHINING BRASS. The damage inflicted was 93 enemy structures destroyed, 48 enemy structures damaged, and one bridge destroyed. In addition to this, UH-1B gunships flew 101 infiltration and exfiltration escort sorties during the same period.

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c. The present UE (Unit Equipment) of the VNAF 83d Tactical Air Group, which supports SHINLIG MASS operations, authorizes 13 H-34 helicopters. Ten H-34's were assigned originally. One aircraft was lost operationally in 1966, and for the remainder of the year the number of aircraft assigned remained at nine. Additional H-34's, to be obtained from the US Navy, will be assigned to the 83d TAG to attain the UE of 18 aircraft.

5. (TSLD) Logistics Airlift Support.

a. During CY 66, Air Operations Logistics Section fraggd 442 missions in support of SOG activities. These were flown in South Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, using SOG C-123 and C-130E aircraft.

b. A total of 4,891,228 pounds of cargo and 13,893 passengers were airlifted during CY 1966. This is a considerable increase over the previous year, caused by expanded operations of SOG.

c. A significant event for the logistics Section during CY 66 occurred on 20 October 1966 when the first SOG C-130 mission was fraggd and flown. This aircraft can carry more than twice the load for greater distances and at higher speeds than the C-123.

d. The following chart shows cargo and passengers airlifted during CY 66. Note that the increase in cargo airlifted during the last three months is due to the addition of C-130's.

CARGO AND PASSENGERS AIRLIFTED DURING CY 66

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CARGO (Pounds)</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>
Jan	345,837	829
Feb	242,715	456
Mar	341,715	1,011
Apr	409,268	916
May	375,624	1,012
Jun	321,227	1,204
Jul	436,535	1,465
Aug	432,814	1,422
Sep	352,833	1,748
Oct	459,064	1,190
Nov	596,254	1,220
Dec	577,342	1,420

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
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SECTION 4 - AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

1. (TSLD) PLANNING AND POLICY:

a. MACSOG msg DTG 100725Z Feb 66 contained the planned development of four additional areas for intelligence, harassment, and psychological operations.



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Inclosure 3 (Combat Operations) to TAB III-4-F (Training Activities at Camp Long Thanh).

(S) The following is a monthly summary of combat operations conducted during 1966. The strength of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Battalion for each month is included.

a. During the year the Security (CIDG) Battalion conducted the following recurring type security operations:

- (1) Daily 50-man road clearing and security detail on highway 15.
- (2) Eight 5-man ambush sites outside of Camp Long Thanh nightly.
- (3) Five 5-man security sites around airfield 24 hours daily.
- (4) One 15-man ambush site in TAOR nightly.
- (5) In addition, search and destroy operations were conducted as shown in the following summary of operations.

b. Summary of combat operations conducted by personnel from Camp Long Thanh during 1966:

- (1) January: CIDG strength 433. Three platoon-size search and destroy operations were conducted in the TAOR. On two of these operations enemy contact was made. Results: 1 VC WIA and 1 VC flag captured.
- (2) February: CIDG strength 410. One company and one platoon size search and destroy operations were conducted. Two company-sized operations were conducted in coordination with the 173rd US Airborne Brigade (No contact with the enemy resulted from this operation). Results: 1 VC WIA, 1 Russian Carbine captured.
- (3) March: CIDG strength 400. Two company-size and three platoon-size search and destroy operations were conducted. Platoon-size elements operated with units of the 1st US Infantry Division. No enemy contact.
- (4) April: CIDG strength 394. Two company and five platoon-size search and destroy operations were conducted. Enemy contact was made. Results: 1 CIDG WIA, 1 US Carbine and 2 US Grenades captured.
- (5) May: CIDG strength 385. One company-size and one platoon-size search and destroy operations were conducted. No enemy contact.
- (6) June: CIDG strength 379. One company and four platoon-size search and destroy operations were conducted. Results: 1 CIDG WIA.

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(7) July: CIDG strength 384. One company-size operation was conducted. No enemy contact.

(8) August: CIDG strength 385. During this month one company-size operation was conducted. Results: 2 CIDG WIA.

(9) September: CIDG strength 452. One company and two platoon-size operations were conducted. Results: 1 VC WIA, 1 Russian Carbine and 1 US Carbine captured.

(10) October: CIDG strength 507. Two company-size search and destroy operations were conducted. Results: 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA, 2 CIDG WIA, 2 VC WIA, 1 US M-16 captured.

(11) November: CIDG strength 504. 1 CIDG 3/4 ton truck was ambushed on highway 15. Results: 9 CIDG KIA, 5 CIDG WIA, 1 LMG lost, 1 60MM Mortar lost, 6 BAR's lost, 6 M2 Carbines lost.

(12) December: CIDG strength 461: During this month, no operations were conducted.

c. Results of operations conducted during 1966.

(1) Enemy: 1 KIA, 4 WIA, 2 Russian Carbines, 1 M-16, 1 M-1, 1 US Carbine, 2 Grenades and 7 Mines captured.

(2) Friendly: 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA, 9 CIDG KIA, 12 CIDG WIA, 1 LMG, 1 60MM Mortar, 6 BAR's and 6 Carbines lost.

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APPENDIX IV - SHINING BRASS

(TSLD) Summary of Operations

a. Background. SHINING BRASS Phase I operations were initiated in October 1965. Reconnaissance (Spike Team) operations were conducted initially at a rate of three to four per month in 1965 and reached an average of 11 per month in 1966. Phase II operations were authorized on 20 June 1966 and were conducted thereafter at a frequency of about two per month.

b. Present Concept of Operations.

(1) Phase I and II operations are authorized in that area of Laos east of a line from X0904212 to YB 4496801 and extending south to Cambodia. A temporary extension exists from the northern limit of the operational area to the DMZ to a depth of five Km into Laos.

(2) Phase III operations have not yet been authorized.

(3) Three Nung exploitation battalions (called a Hornet Force if platoon size, a Havoc Force if company size, and a Haymaker Force if battalion size) and 20 Spike Teams are authorized. Spike Teams and Hornet Forces are recruited and equipped in Saigon by the Liaison Bureau, a combined US/ARVN detachment. Training is conducted at the Forward Operating Bases No 1 and 3 (FOB 1 and 3) at Hue Phu Bai in I Corps, at FOB 2 at Kontum in II Corps and at Kham Duc in II Corps. In-country training missions are conducted from these bases. Out-of-country missions are also conducted from these bases and from DakTo in II Corps and Khe Sanh in I Corps.

(4) SHINING BRASS forces also support the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) by conducting operations to recover US prisoners or evadees, both in and out-of-country.

c. Operational Highlights.

(1) The first ARC LIGHT (B-52 Strike) bomb damage assessment (BDA) in Laos was performed by Spike Team 28 February on target P-1. A total of five ARC LIGHT BDA's were performed during the year.

(2) The first Hornet Force operation was conducted 16 April. A total of 13 exploitation operations by this type unit were conducted during the year.

(3) SHINING BRASS supported III MAF operations in Quang Tri Province during the period 18 September - 15 October by infiltrating nine in-country targets and eight Laos targets (MA-1 through MA-15) near the DMZ.

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(4) The first BRIGHT LIGHT (POW recovery) mission was performed by a Spike Team in NVN on 1 October. The pilot was dead, but his body was recovered. A total of four BRIGHT LIGHT missions were conducted during the year, one in-country, two in NVN, and one in Laos. The last mission successfully recovered a pilot.

(5) The first successful [REDACTED] was conducted by a Spike Team 3-7 October on target MA-10.

(6) A total of 15 prisoners were captured and 72 enemy killed (confirmed body count) by SHINING BRASS elements during this year. Friendly losses were three US and 16 VN KIA, five US and 25 VN MIA.

(7) SHINING BRASS operations are tabulated at TAB IV-A.

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TAB IV-A - SHINING BRASS OPERATIONS, 1966

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>TYPE UNIT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
January (3 ST)	6-8	O-1	Spike Team	
	9-11	M-1	" "	
	13-14	N-1	" "	
February (9 ST)	7-9	U-1	" "	
	7-9	V-1	" "	
	15-18	S-1	" "	
	17-19	Q-1	" "	
	21-23	R-1	" "	
	23-26	H-1	" "	
	28	P-1	" "	BDA ARC LIGHT
	28	O-1	" "	
	28-1 Mar	N-1	" "	BDA ARC LIGHT
March (6 ST)	14-16	X-1	" "	
	15-16	Y-1	" "	
	17-19	Z-1	" "	
	23-26	B-1	" "	
	24-27	B-2	" "	
	26-27	A-2	" "	
April (8 ST & LHF)	2-4	D-2	" "	
	7-8	A-1	" "	1 POW
	10-11	W-1	" "	
	14-16	N-2	" " and Hornet Force	
	18-21	F-2	" "	
	22-26	K-2	" "	
	25-28	L-2	" "	
	28-29	E-2	" "	3 VN KIA
May (10 ST)	8-12	O-2	" "	
	10-12	R-2	" "	1 VC KIA
	12-16	P-2	" "	
	15-17	J-2	" "	
	18	R-2	" "	
	18-22	U-2	" "	
	20-24	V-2	" "	
	24-28	G-1	" "	3 POW, 1 VC KIA 150 NVN seen
	26-30	L-1	" "	
	31-3 Jun	J-3	" "	BDA ARC LIGHT 1 POW

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>TYPE UNIT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	
June (8 ST & 2 HF)	8-11	E-2	Spike Team		
	12-14	J-1	" "		
	12-17	F-3	" "		
	17-20	G-3	" "		
	18-23	I-3	" "	2 VC KIA	
	21-24	H-3	" "	5 VC KIA	
	24-26	O-2	" " and Hornet Force		
	28-2 Jul	Z-1	" " and Hornet Force		
	July	11-15	D-3	" "	1 VC KIA
		16-18	W-3	" "	
22-27		A-4	" "		
23-26		C-4	" "		
23-28		B-4	" "		
26-28		C-4	" "		
27-29		A-4	" "		
28-30		B-4	" "	1 US & 2 VN MIA 1 US & 1 VN KIA	
28-31		D-4	" "		
29-31		A-4	" "	1 POW	
29-2 Aug		C-4	" "		
30-1 Aug		I-3 & F-4	" "	2 POW	
30-2 Aug		D-4	" "		
August (11 ST & 2 HF)		3-4	I-3 & F-4	" "	
		3-7	B-4	" "	
	3-7	C-4	" "		
	6-8	J-4	" "	2 VC KIA, 2 POW	
	7-9	I-4	" "	3 VC KIA, 2 POW	
	7-11	G-4	" "		
	7-12	H-4	" "		
	11-12	F-4	Hornet Force	2 VC KIA	
	19-22	N-3	Spike Team and Hornet Force	1 VC KIA	
	23-26	K-3	Spike Team	1 VN MIA	
	23-26	M-3	" "		
	29-1 Sep	E-4	" "		
	September (15 ST & 3 HF)	2-3	Z-3	" "	
		2-5	Y-3	" "	
		3-5	K-3 & U-3	Hornet Force	BDA ARC LIGHT
3-5		K-3 & U-3	" "	BDA ARC LIGHT	
4-6		Z-3	Spike Team		
8-10		L-3 & V-3	" "	2 VC KIA	
11-15		S-3	" "	4 VC KIA	

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>TYPE UNIT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	
September (Cont'd)	15-18	R-3	Spike Team and Hornet Force		
	18-20	MA-2	Spike Team	In-country	
	18-20	MA-1	" "	" " , 2 VC KIA	
	18-20	MA-4	" "	In-country,	
	21-22	MA-5	" "	" " , 6 VC KIA	
	21-24	MA-3	" "	" " , 2 VC KIA	
	22-24	MA-6	" "	1 POW	
	24-26	MA-1	" "	In-country, 200 VC seen	
	25-28	MA-7	" "	In-country	
	25-29	MA-8	" "	" " , 6 VC KIA, 1 US & 2 VN MIA, 100 VC seen	
	October (12 ST & 2 HF)	1	N. Vietnam	" "	Recovered dead pilot.
		3-4	BRIGHT LIGHT MA-12	" "	1 VC KIA, 3 US & 3 VN MIA
		3-7	MA-10	" "	Wire Tap
8-11		MA-15	" "		
10-11		MA-13	" "	In-country	
11-12		MA-10	" "		
13-15		MA-10	Hornet Force	80-90 VC seen	
16		BRIGHT LIGHT in NVN	Spike Team	4 NVN KIA	
18		BRIGHT LIGHT in IV Corps CRIMSON TIDE	Havoc Force	2 POW, 2 US KIA, 11 VN KIA, 17 VN MIA	
24-28		W-4	Spike Team	3 VC KIA	
27-29		J-5	" "		
27-30		I-5	" "		
29-1		O-3	" "	3 VC KIA	
31-2 Nov		E-5	" "		
November (8 ST & 1 HF)		2-3	A-4	" "	5 VC KIA, 4 VN KIA
	3-8	X-3	" "		
	4-5	L-4	" "		
	7-13	MA-10	" "		
	11-13	H-5	" "		
	13-14	B-3	" "	3 VC KIA	
	18-19	C-3	" "		
	20	G-3	Hornet Force		
	24-28	-2	Spike Team		

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>TYPE UNIT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
December	9-10	P-5	Spike Team	
(11 ST & 2 HF)	9-10	Delta Team	" "	
		Recovery		
	10-11	" "	Hornet Force	6 VC KIA
	13-15	N-5	Spike Team	2 VC KIA
	13-15	R-5	" "	
	14	Delta Team	Hornet Force	
		Recovery		
	15-16	Z-5	Spike Team	
	17-18	M-5	" "	1 VC KIA
	19	O-5	" "	
	20	Q-5	" "	
	21-25	S-5	" "	1 VC KIA
	26-31	C-6	" "	
	27-1 Jan	A-6	" "	

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APPENDIX V - JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (JPRC)

1. (TSLD) CINCPAC Top Secret message DTG 160232Z September 1966 authorized the activation of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center. On 17 September 1966, the Center was activated by COMUSMACV with the following mission: To establish a capability within COMUSMACV for personnel recovery operations subsequent to termination of search and rescue (SAR) efforts. The JPRC was set up to function as a separate staff division within MACSOG. Since activation it has acted as the focal point for all intelligence information relating to detained or missing personnel in the Southeast Asia theater of operations. It has utilized information gathered to prepare basic operational procedures, and to recommend recovery operations, for downed airmen in evadee or escapee status and US or allied prisoners of war.
2. (S) The original activation of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center authorized three officers (1 Col AF, 1 Maj Army, 1 LCDR Navy) and 2 enlisted men. Subsequently two additional officers (1 Maj AF and 1 Maj Army) and one enlisted man were authorized.
3. (TSLD) To complement the Safe-Area program in North Vietnam, the JPRC was directed to establish Safe Area Activation Teams (SAAT). The initial increment of six four-man teams was recruited and trained by late October. Additional teams were recruited, and at the close of the year there were six teams operationally ready with an additional four teams recruited and ready for training. No operations were conducted during 1966 employing the Safe Area Activation Teams.
4. (TSLD) The Joint Personnel Recovery Center in coordination with representatives of 7th Air Force and 7th Fleet developed a new recognition symbol system to be used by airmen in an evasion status. These procedures were approved by CINCPAC and became effective on 1 October. Since that time, JPRC representatives have spent considerable time in the field briefing aircrews of the three component commands on the E&E program. The recognition symbol system now in use requires that the evading airman construct a predesignated code letter from whatever material is available. It is recognized that the airman's task would be made much easier if he had material to construct the code letter available on his person. In an effort to discover some suitable material, the JPRC has conducted experiments involving high altitude photography of code letters constructed of aluminum foil. While this proved quite satisfactory, the JPRC is currently trying to procure some colored light weight plastic material. The JPRC is of the opinion that this material would photograph as well as aluminum foil and would have the added advantage of packaging a sufficient quantity into a smaller packet than a like amount of foil. Also, it would be easier for the downed airman to work with.

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5. (TSLD) Generally speaking, recovery operations have taken one of two forms. The first of these has been the raid type operation against known or suspected enemy prisoner of war camps. The following operations have been of the raid type:

a. Operation Crimson Tide. On 30 August 1966, a 17 year old VC rallied to Chieu Hoi. Interrogation revealed that on 25 August he had observed an American Negro prisoner being held by the VC. He gave a detailed description of the location of the prison site. Aerial photography of the area was requested and flown, but yielded inconclusive results. The rallier was reinterrogated on 28-29 September and based on information acquired in this interrogation, low level photography was requested. An Air Force combat cameraman, using a hand-held camera from an O-1 aircraft, obtained excellent photographs of the area. On 9 October the photographs were flown to Can Tho and shown to the rallier, who positively identified the prison area. The rallier agreed to take a polygraph test, which was administered on 11 October. The results of the test indicated that the rallier probably was telling the truth. Final arrangements were made with the Senior Corps Advisor for IV Corps to conduct a raid. On 18 October, a company-sized recovery force was heliborne to the prison site. This force was accompanied by the source, who pointed out fortifications and areas where booby traps were located. Contact with the VC was made, but no US personnel were recovered. Two VC prisoners captured during the raid would reveal no information regarding US prisoners. Although the operation was terminated without the successful recovery of US prisoners, many valuable operational lessons were learned.

b. Operation Cobra Tail. On 13 December 1966, a confidential informant for the Deputy of Administration, Tay Ninh Province, gave information on US prisoners being held by the VC. This information was given to JPRC on 16 December and arrangements made for a thorough debriefing of the source and a polygraph test. The debrief and polygraph test were accomplished on 18-19 December and the source returned with the debrief team to Saigon. Photographs were requested from 7th Air Force and both verticals and obliques taken. Further debriefs of the source were made by personnel of both the 135th Military Intelligence Group and the Joint Personnel Recovery Center. Because the suspected prisoner of war camp was located inside the Cambodian border, permission from CINCPAC was required to launch the operation. Permission to conduct a raid type operation was requested on 26 December. Further amplifying information was sent to CINCPAC later on the 26th and again on the 28th of December. Permission was granted on 29 December to launch the operation. The operation was launched at approximately 1220H, 30 December, employing elements of the 25th Infantry Division. Contact with the VC was made, but no US prisoners were recovered. 35 VC were killed in action and 34 detainees apprehended. Later interrogation of the detainees disclosed that US prisoners had been seen in the area prior to the operation. Valuable intelligence was gathered from the debriefs as well as from captured documents. Although this operation did not result in the recovery of US prisoners of war, again it provided valuable experience with reference to techniques utilized in this type of operation.

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6. (TSLD) The other type of operation conducted by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center has involved the search of an area where personnel who are evading, or who have escaped, are known or strongly suspected to be. To date these operations have taken place either in North Vietnam or in Laos. The following operations were conducted during 1966:

a. Operation Number 1. On 23 September, a weak beeper signal was heard by aircraft operating in the vicinity of 1806N/10504E. This correlated most closely with a report of [redacted] who went down in the general area on 12 September. A request to launch a recovery operation was made to CINCPAC on 24 September. CINCPAC approved this request contingent upon approval from American Embassies in Bangkok and [redacted]. Bangkok concurred in the Joint Personnel Recovery Center launching a recovery operation, but [redacted] felt they had resources better suited to the task. A ten-man team was launched [redacted] on 26 September. Airborne searches were withdrawn at this time to avoid attracting undue attention to the area. The team was split into two groups, with one group searching the immediate area where the signals were heard, while the other group searched along the axis of natural terrain features in a southeasterly direction. This seemed to be the most probable course the downed airman would take. In addition both teams interrogated village informants in the general area of the search to determine if the pilot had been sighted or aircraft wreckage seen. Both the searches and the interrogations were negative. Teams were withdrawn from the area on 3 October and the operation suspended at that time.

b. Operation Number 2. On 29 September, a report was received that an F4C was down in the vicinity of WE9731 (Laos). Search and Rescue launched a recovery operation at first light, 30 September 1966, and one pilot was recovered. The parachute rescue man sighted the other parachute in the trees, but could not be lowered due to the ruggedness of the terrain. On 30 September, the Joint Search and Rescue Center requested assistance from JPRC. After obtaining necessary approvals, a BRIGHT LIGHT team was launched on the morning of 1 October. At approximately 1635, the body of Major Saul (nmn) Waxman, USAF, was recovered. The recovery was made at coordinates XE1040, which is in North Vietnam rather than Laos. Major Waxman was apparently killed when he released himself from his parachute harness and fell approximately 100 feet from the trees. A CH3 helicopter was employed to infiltrate and exfiltrate the BRIGHT LIGHT team as well as the recovered body. Due to the inaccessibility of the terrain, the helicopter winch was used. This operation was terminated on 1 October.

c. Operation Canasta 572. On 12 October, a Navy A-1, call sign Canasta 572, was downed in the vicinity of 1926N/10533E. Voice contact was made with the pilot and his exact location determined, but search and rescue efforts were unsuccessful due to the enemy situation and the dense tree cover that prevented the lowering of a sling to the pilot. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center was asked for assistance on 14 October. A BRIGHT LIGHT

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team was readied and launched that evening. It arrived on the carrier USS Intrepid at approximately midnight and was prepared to launch at first light, 15 October. The weather on 15 October prevented the launch of the recovery team. On 16 October, the recovery team was helilifted to the area of the downed pilot and landed at a point approximately 800 meters from his last known position. The team planned to sweep toward the pilot in skirmish formation. Approximately 100 meters from the target, the team encountered a large trail under the jungle canopy. This trail was taken under surveillance. After approximately fifteen minutes, a North Vietnamese uniformed patrol, obviously engaged in search, approached within 10 meters of the team and the team leader thought they had been detected. The patrol was engaged and all four members were killed. The team leader requested exfiltration, feeling that the team was compromised. During the exfiltration, one helicopter was hit by ground fire at the exfiltration point. On the flight out, the helicopter was again hit and three team members (one US, two VN) received minor fragment wounds. The helicopter was eventually lost. Electronic and visual searches of the area were continued for several days with negative results and the operation was suspended. It was learned later that the pilot who was the object of this operation had been captured.

d. Operation Shark. At approximately 1810 on 27 October, an Air Force F-105 went down in the vicinity of YB2025. A forward air controller working in the area in conjunction with a SHINING BRASS operation established voice contact with the downed pilot. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center was notified and a BRIGHT LIGHT mission requested. A radio message was sent to Dak To requesting a helicopter be sent for a recovery operation. Two Army UH-1B gunships and one unarmed helicopter were dispatched to the scene. The pilot was located when he fired three pen gun flares. Using his landing light, the unarmed UH-1B helicopter picked the pilot up at approximately 1900 hours and the operation was terminated.

e. Operation Commando 01. On 16 November 1966, an Air Force Al-G, call sign Commando 01, went down in the vicinity of coordinates 1525N/10633E. Three crewmen were on board the aircraft and all exited the aircraft successfully. Search and Rescue efforts were initiated immediately and the pilot and co-pilot recovered. The crew chief, who was the first man to leave the aircraft, was not found. The pilot stated he had definitely seen the crew chief with a good chute. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center was notified of the above developments and the fact that search and recovery efforts had been suspended. The [redacted] was contacted and asked to provide search and recovery forces. At the same time, a flash message was sent to the American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos outlining the situation and asking that the feasibility of a search in the area [redacted] be explored. Vientiane considered the search feasible and prepositioned forces for infiltration into the area on 17 November. At sunset on 16 November, an Air American Dornier made a loudspeaker flight over the area advising the downed airman to build a fire for recognition purposes as a night low level recce would be flown that evening and that indigenous recovery forces would

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be searching the area beginning the following day. An A26 aircraft performed the low level recce the night of the 16th with negative results. On 17 November, a recovery team of 40 personnel was infiltrated into the area by HH3 helicopters of the 20th Air Commando Squadron and search operations were started. On 18 November, the search force was augmented to a total strength of 150 personnel. Search operations continued throughout an eight day period. During the eight day period, a total of 175 FAR troops and 70 SGU CAS forces participated in the search and a total of 70 air sorties were flown. The main body of troops searched the area where the airman's parachute was believed to have fallen and found no sign of the airman or his chute. Villagers questioned in the area claimed to have no knowledge of the airman's fate. It was felt the airman was either killed or captured within 48 hours after bailout. The operation was suspended on 24 November.

f) Operation Scramble. On 2 December, a Delta Team (Reconnaissance unit of 5th Special Forces Group) composed of two US and four indigenous members on an in-country mission inadvertently crossed the border into Laos. They were surrounded in the vicinity of XD 633631. In an attempt to exfiltrate the team by helicopter, one helicopter was shot down with five crewmembers aboard. Permission was requested and granted to launch recovery operations. Launch of the recovery operation was delayed due to bad weather. On 5 December, two indigenous team members were picked up in South Vietnam. They had last seen the two US and remaining two indigenous team members on 2 December. At that time they were involved in a fire fight and one US member had a chest and leg wound and the other US member was with him. One indigenous member had been killed in action and the other was believed to have been captured. On 9 December, a Spike Team infiltrated into the area and was followed on 10 December by a Hornet Force, which was eventually built up to 80 men. They found the helicopter with the remains of the 5 crewmembers still on board. The remains had been mutilated by the unfriendlies and burned from the crash. The bodies had been heavily booby-trapped. These teams exfiltrated on 10 December. On 14 December, an ARC LIGHT strike was made on the downed helicopter. Subsequently a Hornet Force of approximately 35 personnel infiltrated into the area by helicopter. Two complete bodies and partial remains on an unknown number of others were recovered. All of the remains were exfiltrated by the Hornet Force on 14 December. The operation was terminated.

7. (TSLD) In a totally different approach to personnel recovery, the JPRC is currently working with MACSOG PSYOP personnel on a program of leaflet and/or airborne loudspeaker operations designed to inform the populace that they will receive handsome monetary rewards for assisting downed US airmen to return to friendly control. Funds to finance this program will be included in the next SOG budget. It is planned that this program initially will be undertaken in Laos.

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8. (TSLD) Procedures designed to effect the recovery of downed airmen call for a survival kit to be dropped once a code letter has been sighted. An attempt will then be made to establish electronic contact with the evadee. JPRC is in the process of packaging thirty air-droppable kits. Fifteen of these will be designed to be dropped from high performance aircraft and the remainder from low speed aircraft. The kits will be prepositioned at several different sites to provide a capability for immediate reaction once a code letter has been sighted.

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APPENDIX VI - LOGISTICS

1. (TSLD) PERSONNEL:

a. Logistic positions authorized under changes to the Joint Table of Distribution at the end of CY 65 and which were filled during CY 66 included those of the Comptroller, Budget Analyst, Transportation Officer, Civil Engineer, and Assistant Supply Officer. One additional space was authorized and filled during the year, that of Research and Development Officer.



2. (TSLD) SUPPLY & SERVICES:

a. The expansion of SHINING BRASS through the addition of 10 reconnaissance teams and three battalion-size exploitation forces created initial supply demands of considerable scope. Although the time from approval of the expansion to its inception was less than a month, all supply commitments were met on schedule.

b. It became apparent during the first quarter that a basic change in the concept of logistic support for SOG was required, brought about as a result of the overall US buildup of forces. In prior years, when the US commitment in RVN was small, it was necessary for SOG to obtain the greatest portion of its supplies through the Counterinsurgency Support Office (CISO) 2nd Logistical Command, Okinawa. With the buildup and the establishment of the service logistics sources in Vietnam, all classes of supply of common items used by SOG became more readily available through in-country sources. Accordingly, the decision was made to use US in-country resources wherever possible to meet SOG requirements.

c. To take maximum advantage of in-country resources, Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA) were concluded with Army, Navy, and Air Force components. This greatly facilitated service as well as supply support for widely scattered SOG elements.

d. SOG supplies from off-shore sources previously had been shipped utilizing the shipping designator of the 5th Special Forces in Nha Trang. This meant, in most cases, double or triple handling of supply items. To overcome this, shipping designators were obtained for SOG units at Saigon, Nha Trang, and Danang. This enabled shipments, where practicable, to be made directly to the unit, thus reducing shipping time, lost shipments, and transportation requirements.

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e. In prior years, SOG had procured many items of supply from the local Vietnamese economy. With the build-up and the accompanying inflation, this practice had an adverse effect on the SOG budget. In addition, the quality of goods so obtained became generally poorer. To reduce piastre expenditures, SOG shifted procurement of items such as indigenous uniforms and equipment to CISO. The lower cost and increased quality of material obtained more than compensated for the increase in stockage requirements.

### 3. (TSLD) FACILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION:

a. Again, the expansion of SHINING BRASS had a significant effect. Construction of camps was begun at Kontum and Hue Phu Bai and facilities at Kham Duc were expanded. Construction of a headquarters building, a BEQ and BOQ was completed for the C&C Detachment in Danang.

b. The Naval Advisory Detachment completed the move of its action teams to Camp Black Rock in the 2nd quarter of CY 66, and made plans for consolidation of the remainder of the operational and support facilities including the SEAL Advisory Team to the Black Rock area. Construction employing Seabee labor had begun at year's end.

c. Construction at Camp Long Thanh included some [REDACTED] barracks, but for the most part consisted of rehabilitation of camp defenses and buildings. Construction in Saigon was limited to a vehicle repair shed and a warehouse shed for SOG Supply.

d. At Nha Trang, alteration of the 1st Flight Detachment BOQ was completed. To accommodate personnel assigned to the C-130 Detachment, arrangements were made with 7th Air Force for construction of crew quarters. This building was completed in the 4th quarter of CY 66.

### 4. (TSLD) CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT REVIEW PANEL (CERP):

a. In July the CERP was established. This panel was comprised of representatives of all SOG agencies with the threefold mission of (1) reviewing items of clothing and equipment currently in use to determine suitability (2) reviewing new items of clothing and equipment for possible application and (3) establishing requirements for new items of clothing or equipment.

b. The first meeting was held in July with subsequent meetings in September and December. As a result of the panel, numerous changes were made

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in existing clothing and equipment, either through type change, source, design or a combination. It also served as a valuable vehicle in showing all SOG agencies clothing and equipment which was available to meet their requirements and getting a free exchange of ideas.

c. The December meeting included a representative from the Counterinsurgency Support Office (CISO), 2nd Logistical Command, Okinawa, which is responsible for the off-shore procurement of many items of clothing, equipment, and rations for the SOG.

5. (TSLD) BUDGET & FISCAL:

a. Due to delay in congressional approval of supplementary funds for FY66, funds for 34A & SHINING BRASS programs for the 3rd quarter of FY66 were not received until March. However, this had no adverse effect upon operations.

b. CINCPAC requested a SOG estimate for additional funds necessary for the OP-34 program to finance common ammunition requirements in support of PTFs during 4th quarter FY66 and for FY67. After submission of the estimate by SOG, CINCPAC decided that the Navy would continue to provide PTF ammunition support through FY67. SOG has programmed this requirement into the FY68 budget.

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h. The Comptroller Division, authorized by JCS in October 1965, became functional in July. This added a Comptroller and Budget Analyst to the Finance Officer previously authorized. The need for these additional personnel had become most urgent due to the size of the programs, and their assignment had an immediate salutary effect in the management of financial resources within SOG.

i. CNO directed the Naval Audit Office to conduct an audit of SOG with the view to assisting and guiding the new SOG Comptroller. As a result of this audit conducted in July & August, recommendations were made. By years end 29 of these recommendations had either been partially or fully implemented. Exception was taken to two recommendations, by SOG, and alternate procedures initiated in these cases.





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APPENDIX VII - PLANS

1. (S) Mission. Advises the Commander, SOG, on all matters pertaining to SOG planning responsibilities to include COMUSSEASIA UW Plans, COMUSMACV current and contingency operations plans, and other special planning requirements. Prepares plans, studies, reports, updates documents and executes other staff actions as directed. Provides direction and tasks other branches of the SOG Staff, and when required, [REDACTED] to insure that required plans are prepared in essential detail in a timely manner and are maintained current.

2. (TSLD) Accomplishments.

a. Published Plans.

(1) 37C-66 (Cross Border Operations into Cambodia) (TSLD). Envisions covert cross-border operations to collect intelligence on VC/NVN activities and combat operations against selected targets to destroy them.

(2) 37D-66 (Maritime Measures to Deal with Cambodian Support to the Viet Cong)(TSLD). Envisions covert/ clandestine maritime operations to collect intelligence on VC/NVN activities ashore in Cambodian coastal areas.

(3) 37E-66 (Operations to Encourage Defections from NVN) (TSLD). Envisions special covert maritime operations along the coast of NVN in the Gulf of Tonkin.

(4) SOG General Plan for FY68 (U). Projects SOG operations through the period FY 68 and provides guidance to Branch Chiefs and subordinate commands in the preparation of supporting programs.

b. Other projects completed:

(1) JUWTF JTD. Organization of JUWTF SEASIA under conditions of limited or general war.

(2) Annex N (UW) to MACV OPLAN FULL CRY (U). Contingency Plan for the conduct of UW in the PLATEAU DES BOLOVENS area of Southern Laos in support of conventional ground force operations.

c. Projects in progress:

(1) JUWTF OPLAN 1-66 (General War) (U) JUSTF General War Plan supports COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 1-66 (U), and contingency plans 32-64 Ph III - IV (U) and 39-65 (U).

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(2) Annex N (UW) to MACV OPLAN RUBDOWN I/II (U). Contingency plan for the conduct of UW in CAMBODIA in support of Ground Force Operations.

(3) Cease-fire Contingency Plan (U). Contingency plan outlining options available to SOG for the continuation of operations following cessation of overt hostilities.

(4) Modified Practice Nine Plan (U). Variations of the Practice Nine Barrier Plan involving the use of SHINING BRASS assets north of Highway 9 in LAOS.

(5) SOG/STS Three-year Plan (U). Combined plan for the conduct of SOG/STS operations during the time frame FY 68 - FY 70.

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APPENDIX VIII - COMMUNICATIONS

1. (SLD) OPERATIONS

a. The SOG Communications Center transmitted and received approximately 2500 messages per month.

[REDACTED]

c. Restoration priorities for the teletype circuits serving SOG are on the 2 level. To prevent the SOG circuit to Danang from being preempted, an agreement with MACV COC was worked out in October. Under this agreement, MACV COC awards a temporary 24 hour 1d priority of restoration during missions, based on a telephoned request from SOG.

d. Camp Long Thanh started the year with only one authorized frequency in the VHF FM range and no authorized frequencies in other ranges. Two VHF FM, one VHF in the area of 120 mc and one UHF frequency were added in Oct, Nov and Dec. This now provides Camp Long Thanh with a satisfactory capability for base security patrols and aircraft control.

e. A secure pony circuit between SOG comm center and MACV I was activated to pass "Immediate" and "Flash" precedence outgoing traffic. Less than half of this circuit's capability was being utilized initially.

[REDACTED]

In early December an agreement was reached with J-6 and J-1 to allow passing incoming to SOG "Immediate" and "Flash" precedence traffic by the MACVJ-6 Comm Center. This action saved many vehicular trips per day to MACV I.

[REDACTED]

2. (SLD) FACILITIES & CIRCUITRY

a. Khe Sanh, Kontum and Phu Bai Launch bases for C&C Detachment were added to the SOG SSB Net.

[REDACTED]

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c. A new point to point secure voice facility was installed between the JPRC and SAR at Tan Son Nhut upon activation of the JPRC.

d. A project was begun to add a TTY alternate circuit on circuit OP-26 from Danang Control to C&C Detachment. This will make OP-26 a multipoint net plus giving a higher reliability in the Danang area. In addition, a TTY net is being established between C & C Detachment and the FOBs and launch sites. At the close of the year the project was still incomplete due to difficulties encountered in the procurement of the required equipment.

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## SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### OF THE

### DOD ELECTRONIC FORMS WORKING GROUP

The DoD Electronic Forms Working Group was organized and convened under the authority of the Director, Administration and Management, on August 23, 1990, to review the issues of controlling and managing electronic forms and to implement a standardized electronic forms solution which would meet the needs of the total DoD community, be cost effective, provide for the integrity of DOD forms, and facilitate the electronic interchange of forms and information.

The agreements and recommendations outlined hereto represent the consensus of the designated representatives of the five Chartered members (Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, Defense Information Systems Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency), under the chairmanship of the DoD Forms Management Officer. The representatives designated by their agencies to participate in the Electronic Forms Working Group were the Component's Forms Management Officer (FMO).

#### I. Problems Addressed:

End-users in all the DoD Components have relatively unrestricted access to technology which permits forms to be electronically designed or paper form copy to be electronically duplicated on an ad hoc basis.

Under these conditions, the established review processes and internal controls at all DoD levels may have been seriously compromised in the accomplishment of the following objectives of the Paperwork Reduction Act and the DoD Electronic Data Interchange Initiative. These objectives are to:

- ensure the integrity of the forms being generated and of the information being collected on the forms;
- prevent multiple duplication of a single electronic form and minimize the total DoD cost;
- encourage DoD-wide use of an open-system technology standard for electronic forms design and fill-in to permit electronic interchange of information captured on forms within DoD and between DoD and its external affiliates; and
- control unnecessary DoD expenditures for rekeying information collected on forms into database storage systems already in use within DoD.

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## II. Agreements on An Approach to a Solution:

1. Identify a software package that can be purchased by all DoD components and used on standard non-proprietary hardware operating systems for use as an electronic forms management system tool.

2. Use this software in the DIOR, WHS, to design Department of Defense (DD), Secretary of Defense (SD), and those Standard Forms (SF) and Optional Forms (OF) sponsored by the DoD and authorized for electronic generation. The electronic versions will be made available to DoD Component FMOs for further internal distribution.

3. Using this standard forms design software, DoD Component FMOs are encouraged to produce and distribute electronic versions of the Component-level forms they develop, and to make further electronic distribution within their agencies.

4. The DoD FMOs will produce electronic forms in accordance with the policies and standards prescribed in DoDI 7750.7, "DoD Forms Management Program"; DoD 7750.7-M, "DoD Forms Management Program Procedures Manual"; and periodic supplemental guidance thereto. All existing approval processes for creating, revising, or cancelling DD and SD Forms, and DoD sponsored SFs and OFs, and requests for exceptions as described in the DoDI 7750.7 and DoD 7750.7-M apply; except, paper versions may be substituted with electronic diskettes to permit more efficient processing at every stage of the design and approval processes.

5. DoD FMOs will produce electronic forms in compliance with all current Federal and DoD Information Resources Management policies and procedures to ensure collected data can be exchanged with database applications on various standard non-proprietary computer systems already in existence throughout DoD. This will become increasingly more important as DoD agencies become involved with Electronic Data Interchange with the business/commerce initiatives currently being promoted.

## III. Recommendations:

1. An electronic forms technology system be established in the DIOR, WHS, and within each Electronic Forms Working Group Component Forms Management Office, at the respective Component's expense.

2. The following standards be accepted for DoD-wide use in all aspects (the creation, revision, fill-in, cancellation, distribution, storage, and printing) of electronic forms management:



a. Each Component Forms Management Officer within the DoD Electronic Forms Working Group will use the Navy Standard Desktop "Companion" Contract to acquire PerFORM Pro forms software. The specifications contained in the Navy RFP for forms software were determined to be consistent with the DoD Electronic Forms Working Group criteria for specific functional capabilities required for electronic management of the DoD Forms Program.

b. The DoD Electronic Forms Working Group will establish clear objectives, cost/benefit ratios, and performance standards for implementation of the electronic forms standardization initiative and will continue to provide general direction and advice to non-member DoD Components for this initiative.

c. The Air Force will serve as the lead Component for testing the acceptability of the standard software and SAF/AAIAI will provide technical expertise to other representatives of the DoD Electronics Forms Working Group.

d. The DIOR, WHS, will serve as the mission authority on the acceptability of the software with respect to reliability, integrity, production quality, and ease of use, and on the overall effectiveness of the electronic forms initiative in promoting the accomplishment of its missions in the DoD Forms Management Program.

Respectfully submitted,  
The DoD Electronic Forms Working  
Group

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CONCURRENCES TO THE AGREEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
OF THE  
DOD ELECTRONIC FORMS WORKING GROUP

Army	<i>for Ronald D. Manning</i> ROBERT S. MANNING Deputy Director for Policy	<i>7 Oct 91</i> (Date)
Navy	_____ EDWARD C. WHITMAN Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (C41/EW Space)	_____ (Date)
Air Force	_____ ROBERT J. McCORMICK Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force	_____ (Date)
DLA	_____ W. DAVID KERLIN Chief, Publishing Division	_____ (Date)
DISA	_____ SARAH JANE LEAGUE Chief Information Officer	_____ (Date)

CONCURRENCES TO THE AGREEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
OF THE  
DOD ELECTRONIC FORMS WORKING GROUP

Army

\_\_\_\_\_  
ROBERT S. MANNING  
Deputy Director for Policy

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)

Navy

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*Edward C. Whitman* \*\*  
EDWARD C. WHITMAN  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of the Navy (C41/EW Space)

\*\* See 1 Nov 91 memo

\_\_\_\_\_  
11/1/91  
(Date)

Air Force

\_\_\_\_\_  
ROBERT J. MCCORMICK  
Administrative Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Air Force

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)

DLA

\_\_\_\_\_  
W. DAVID KERLIN  
Chief, Publishing Division

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)

DISA

\_\_\_\_\_  
SARAH JANE LEAGUE  
Chief Information Officer

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
(Research, Development and Acquisition)  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

1 Nov 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT, OSD

Subj: DOD ELECTRONIC FORMS STANDARDIZATION PROJECT

Ref: (a) SECDEF memo of 26 Aug 91

Encl: (1) Summary of Agreements and Recommendations of the  
DOD Electronic Forms Working Group

As requested by reference (a), enclosure (1) has been reviewed.

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The Department of the Navy concurs in the agreements and recommendations of the DOD Electronic Forms Working Group with the understanding that future work in this area will take a broad approach, fully recognizing the interrelationships of data administration and personal computers with electronic forms management. This broad perspective may well lead to adoption of standards other than the PerFORM software recommended by the working group.

Point of contact for this matter is Ms. Alcinda Wenberg at (703) 602-2354.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Edward C. Whitman", is positioned above the typed name.

EDWARD C. WHITMAN  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of the Navy (C4I/EW/Space)

CONCURRENCES TO THE AGREEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
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DOD ELECTRONIC FORMS WORKING GROUP

Army

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ROBERT S. MANNING  
Deputy Director for Policy


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Navy

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EDWARD C. WHITMAN  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of the Navy (C41/EW Space)

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(Date)

Air Force

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
ROBERT J. MCCORMICK  
Administrative Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Air Force

20 Sep 91  
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(Date)

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(Date)

DISA

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SARAH JANE LEAGUE  
Chief Information Officer

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)

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
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CONCURRENCES TO THE AGREEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
OF THE  
DOD ELECTRONIC FORMS WORKING GROUP

Army	<u>ROBERT S. MANNING</u> Deputy Director for Policy	<u>(Date)</u>
Navy	<u>EDWARD C. WHITMAN</u> Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (C41/EW Space)	<u>(Date)</u>
Air Force	<u>ROBERT J. MCCORMICK</u> Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force	<u>(Date)</u>
DLA	<u>W. DAVID KERLIN</u> Chief, Publishing Division	<u>(Date)</u>
DISA	<u><i>Sarah Jane League</i></u> SARAH JANE LEAGUE Chief Information Officer	<u><i>17 Sep 91</i></u> (Date)